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WHY DIDN’T THE COMMON LAW FOLLOW THE FLAG?
Christian R. Burset*
This Article considers a puzzle about how different kinds of law came
to be distributed around the world. The legal systems of some European
colonies largely reflected the laws of the colonizer. Other colonies exhibited a greater degree of legal pluralism, in which the state administered a mix of different legal systems. Conventional explanations for
this variation look to the extent of European settlement: where colonizers settled in large numbers, they chose to bring their own laws; otherwise, they preferred to retain preexisting ones. This Article challenges
that assumption by offering a new account of how and why the British
Empire selectively transplanted English law to the colonies it acquired
during the eighteenth century. The extent to which each colony received
English law depended on a political decision about what kind of colony
policymakers wanted to create. Eighteenth-century observers agreed
that English law could turn any territory into an anglicized, commercial
colony on the model of Britain’s North American settlements. Preserving preexisting laws, in contrast, would produce colonial economies
that enriched the empire as a whole but kept local subjects poor and
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politically disadvantaged. By controlling how much English law each
colony received, British officials hoped to shape its economic, political,
and cultural trajectory. This historical account revises not only our understanding of how the common law spread but also prevailing ideas
about law’s place in development policy today.
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INTRODUCTION
Most of the world’s legal systems bear legacies of empire.1 The nature
of that legacy varies. In some colonies, the legal system mostly reflected

1

See Daniel M. Klerman et al., Legal Origin or Colonial History?, 3 J. Legal Analysis 379,
380 (2011) (noting that French colonies generally inherited French civil law, while British
colonies English common law); see also Jane Burbank & Frederick Cooper, Empires in World
History: Power and the Politics of Difference 1–3 (2010) (noting that until the 1960s, most
people lived as imperial subjects).
This Article uses the following abbreviations when citing archival sources: BL (British Library); BRBML (Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University); SA (Sheffield Archives, U.K.); TNA (The National Archives, U.K.); WLCL (William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan).
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the colonizer’s own laws.2 In others, the colonial state administered a mix
of different legal traditions, in what is sometimes described as legal pluralism.3 The presence or absence of colonial legal pluralism continues to
affect legal, social, and economic outcomes in many postcolonial countries today.4
Most scholars assume that this variation was the inevitable product of
European settlement patterns. Where colonizers settled in large numbers
(the story goes), they brought their own laws with them; otherwise, they
retained preexisting ones.5 This Article challenges that consensus by offering a new account of how and why the British Empire selectively transplanted English law to the colonies it acquired during the eighteenth century. It argues that the extent to which each colony received English law
depended on a deliberate effort to direct its political and economic

2
This was true, for instance, of the thirteen British colonies that became the United States.
Colonial courts and legislatures sometimes gave English law a local accent, but metropolitan
and provincial lawyers spoke the same legal language. See infra Section II.A; cf. Lawrence
M. Friedman, A History of American Law 15 (3d ed. 2005) (describing colonial law as a
“dialect[]” of English law).
3
This Article uses “legal pluralism” to mean the imperial state’s administration of multiple
kinds of law. See Mitra Sharafi, Justice in Many Rooms Since Galanter: De-Romanticizing
Legal Pluralism Through the Cultural Defense, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 139, 142 (2008)
(citing M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws 1
(1975)). This is sometimes referred to as “classic” legal pluralism, in contrast to the “new”
legal pluralism, which describes the coexistence of state and nonstate norms. See, e.g., Robert
W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 69 (1984); John Griffiths, What Is
Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L. 1 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal
Pluralism, 22 Law & Soc’y Rev. 869, 872–74 (1988); cf. Vernon V. Palmer, Empires as Engines of Mixed Legal Systems 3 (Tulane Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-13, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3020404 (using
“boxed pluralism” to describe a system in which “a significant part of the private law” varies
among ethnic or racial groups). For the history of the term, see Paul D. Halliday, Laws’ Histories: Pluralisms, Pluralities, Diversity, in Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500–1850, at 261,
263–67 (Lauren Benton & Richard J. Ross eds., 2013); Sharafi, supra, at 142; Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 Sydney L. Rev.
375, 390–96 (2008).
4
See, e.g., Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third
World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 Yale L.J. 996, 1040–42 (2006); Lauren Honig, Selecting the State or Choosing the Chief? The Political Determinants of Smallholder Land Titling, 100 World Dev. 94, 94 (2017); Hanna Lerner, Critical Junctures, Religion, and Personal
Status Regulations in Israel and India, 39 Law & Soc. Inquiry 387, 403 (2014).
5
See infra Part I; see also Daniel Oto-Peralías & Diego Romero-Ávila, Legal Reforms and
Economic Performance: Revisiting the Evidence 7–13 (World Development Report Background Paper, 2017) (summarizing the literature).
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development.6 Policymakers believed that English law could turn any territory into an anglicized, commercial colony on the model of Britain’s
North American settlements. Legal pluralism, in contrast, would lead to
extractive economies that benefitted metropolitan elites but kept local
subjects relatively poor and politically disadvantaged. By controlling how
much English law each colony received, British officials believed they
could shape its economic, political, and cultural trajectory.7
6
This Article uses a broad definition of “development” that encompasses both economic
growth and the quality of governance. See Ronald J. Daniels, Michael J. Trebilcock & Lindsey
D. Carson, The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 111, 112 n.2 (2011). Eighteenth-century
writers used “political economy” in a similarly broad sense. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constitution-Making in the Shadow of Empire, 56 Am. J. Legal Hist. 84, 91 (2016) (defining
“political economy” as “the relation between political structure and economic development”);
see also Timothy Mitchell, Society, Economy, and the State Effect, in The Anthropology of
the State: A Reader 169, 182 (Aradhana Sharma & Akhil Gupta eds., 2006) (“The term political economy referred to the proper economy, or management, of the polity, a management
whose purpose was to improve the wealth and security of the population.”).
7
This argument builds on a growing body of work that highlights the importance of politics
in forming legal institutions. See, e.g., Daniel Klerman, Economics of Legal History, in 3 The
Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics 409, 414–16, 425–26, 430–31 (Francesco Parisi
ed., 2017); Daniel Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, Legal Origin?, 35 J. Comp. Econ. 278, 279
(2007). My argument is especially indebted to work that has emphasized the role of political
conflict in forging colonial and postcolonial law. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting
Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–
1830, at 260 (2005); Claire Priest, Currency Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New
England, 110 Yale L.J. 1303, 1316 (2001).
Several recent publications have been particularly relevant. This Article’s emphasis on partisan politics owes much to Heather Welland’s account of the Quebec Act. Heather Welland,
Commercial Interest and Political Allegiance: The Origins of the Quebec Act, in Revisiting
1759: The Conquest of Canada in Historical Perspective 166 (Phillip Buckner & John G. Reid
eds., 2012). The argument here differs from hers in two ways. First, she describes the Quebec
Act as emerging from a “paternal” and “interventionist” vision of empire, which she contrasts
with the less regulatory approach of those who wanted to anglicize Canadian law. Id. at 182.
This Article, however, argues that many of the Quebec Act’s opponents also contemplated an
activist state. Second, although Welland notes that legal pluralism was controversial, this Article offers a fuller explanation of why contemporaries cared about which legal system governed Quebec. Robert Travers’s work on Bengal also stresses the role of ideological conflict
in shaping colonial law. But while his book offers an unmatched guide to the origins of the
East India Company’s legal policy in Bengal, it focuses on debates about what kind of legal
pluralism should emerge, a focus that sometimes discounts arguments for anglicizing Indian
law. See Robert Travers, Ideology and Empire in Eighteenth Century India: The British in
Bengal 50 (2007). Paul Halliday and G. Edward White also examine debates about extending
English law to India, although they focus on habeas corpus, while this Article emphasizes
private law. See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text,
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 651–67 (2008). Finally,
an extensive body of sociolegal and social-science literature has used the concepts of path
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Recovering the political contingency of colonial legal systems sheds
new light on law’s role in shaping political and economic development
today.8 Scholars across a range of disciplines agree that a country’s welfare depends at least partly on the quality of its institutions.9 But efforts
to determine which institutions matter have proved more controversial.10
In particular, scholars continue to debate whether some legal systems—
particularly the common law—promote better economic or political outcomes than others.11
Although scholars and practitioners disagree about the answer, their
efforts have generally proceeded from a shared premise: that the distribution of colonial legal institutions offers a natural experiment about the
effects of different kinds of law on development.12 This Article questions
that common assumption. The distribution of English law reflected a prior
choice about whether a particular colony would be an economic “winner”
or “loser.” If the common law did promote economic growth in the British
Empire, its superiority depended at least partly on a self-fulfilling prophecy. English law spurred development because anglophone settlers and
merchants thought it would—and they acted accordingly by favoring investment and settlement in English-law jurisdictions.
To some extent, then, this Article reinforces recent skepticism about
the innate superiority of Western or English law.13 But it also offers a
warning for those inclined to elevate this skepticism into an outright celebration of legal diversity. When contemporary commentators tally the
sins of colonialism, they usually list legal pluralism as one of the few
things European empires got right, and perhaps even something that
dependency and critical junctures to highlight the role of political conflict in shaping colonial
and postcolonial legal institutions. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 4; Mila Versteeg, History,
Geography, and Rights: A Response to Chilton and Posner, 56 Va. J. Int’l L. 501, 504–05
(2016).
8
Cf. Mark Brown, “An Unqualified Human Good”? On Rule of Law, Globalization, and
Imperialism, 43 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1391, 1405–09 (2018) (surveying scholarship on the link
between colonial history and present-day rule-of-law initiatives).
9
See infra notes 271–273.
10
See infra note 272.
11
See infra notes 273–282.
12
See, e.g., Daniels et al., supra note 6, at 125; Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 765, 769 (2009) (describing the methodology of the legal
origins theory); Daniel Oto-Peralías & Diego Romero-Ávila, The Distribution of Legal Traditions Around the World: A Contribution to the Legal-Origins Theory, 57 J. L. & Econ. 561,
570 (2014).
13
See infra Section V.B.
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multicultural democracies might emulate today.14 The history uncovered
in this Article offers a grimmer message: that pluralism itself can serve as
an instrument of imperial exploitation.
Indeed, this Article argues that the tendency to celebrate legal pluralism
helped to justify Britain’s turn toward a more authoritarian and exploitative form of colonial rule. As a result of the Seven Years’ War (1754–63),
Britain seized several territories from rival empires.15 Spanish Florida became British West Florida and East Florida.16 France gave up Quebec,
Senegal, and the four “Ceded Islands” in the West Indies.17 Two years
later, the British East India Company (EIC) acquired the diwani of Bengal, which gave the Company the right to collect the region’s tax revenues
and the responsibility to administer civil justice.18 Britain transplanted

14

See infra notes 307–309.
Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British
North America, 1754–1766, at 505–06 (2000).
16
West Florida encompassed parts of present-day Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, as
well as the Florida Panhandle. East Florida encompassed the rest of present-day Florida. Colin
G. Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America 152
(2006).
17
I.e., Dominica, Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Tobago. Elizabeth
Mancke, Another British America: A Canadian Model for the Early Modern British Empire,
25 J. Imperial & Commonwealth Hist. 1, 1 (1997). France also surrendered the Illinois Country, the region east of the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio River. Because the Quebec
Act of 1774 merged Illinois into Quebec, this Article treats those two colonies as one, despite
differences in how each was governed before 1774.
18
This Article generally treats Bengal as if it were an ordinary British colony. Strictly speaking, Bengal was administered not by the British state but by the EIC, a chartered corporation
with a long history of guarding its independence. See Philip J. Stern, The Company-State:
Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India 63
(2011). By the 1760s, however, the Company was heavily regulated by Parliament, especially
with respect to the law it administered in India. See Philip Lawson, The East India Company:
A History 120–21 (1993); infra note 109. As a result, it makes sense to view British policy in
India as the product of political conflict, not just the decision of a corporation united around a
common vision of profit maximization. Moreover, even when Parliament did not intervene
directly, Company policies often depended on internal battles between corporate factions with
distinct political agendas—to the extent that shareholders’ meetings became known as “little
parliaments.” H.V. Bowen, Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics
1757–1773, at 39 (1991). Shareholders and directors often wished to conform the Company’s
agenda to their own political commitments; at the same time, each group argued that its own
political program would make the Company more profitable. As a result, questions of corporate governance became entangled with broader debates about the future of the British Empire.
See Lucy S. Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics 17 (1952);
James Vaughn, The Politics of Empire: Metropolitan Socio-Political Development and the
Imperial Transformation of the British East India Company, 1675–1775, at 507–73 (2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with ProQuest). In light of
15
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English law to most of these colonies. But in Bengal and Quebec, it
adopted a policy of legal pluralism, partially introducing English law
while continuing to administer Hindu and Islamic law in the former and
French civil law in the latter.19
The kind of law that Britain imposed in each colony reflected different
agendas for colonial development. Britain transplanted English law to
Senegal, the West Indies, and the Floridas because politicians agreed that
those colonies should develop anglicized societies and commercial economies.20 When it came to Bengal and Quebec, however, politicians disagreed about what kind of development Britain should encourage.21 On
one hand, Tories wanted Britain to withhold English law in order to keep
those colonies culturally isolated, economically dependent on Britain, and
politically docile. Whigs, on the other hand, insisted that Britain should
govern all colonies based on a global common law that would both reflect
and promote the equality of all British subjects. Britain ultimately imposed pluralistic legal systems in Bengal and Quebec because Tories prevailed.22
Tories won in part because they reframed colonial legal policy as a
moral issue.23 Although many Tories were attracted to legal pluralism because of its political-economic consequences, they also argued that Britain had a duty to preserve the laws of its conquered subjects. Some Tories,
such as Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, described the preservation of local
laws as a humanitarian duty; others, such as Governor-General Warren
Hastings, deployed the language of rights. But although the details of
these arguments varied, they successfully divided the opposition and
helped to legitimate a new form of empire that was culturally tolerant,
authoritarian, and exploitative.

this entanglement, this Article elides the Company’s independent significance in order to focus on the substance of arguments about colonial legal policy.
19
Some scholars argue that “Hindu law” was itself a British invention. See, e.g., Nandini
Bhattacharyya Panda, Appropriation and Invention of Tradition: The East India Company and
Hindu Law in Early Colonial Bengal 2 (2008). This Article uses “Hindu law” to describe what
British officials thought they were administering.
20
See infra Section III.B.
21
For an explanation of Britain’s political parties, see infra Part II, especially notes 115–
117.
22
See infra Section III.A.
23
See infra Section IV.A.
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I. THE PUZZLE OF LEGAL PLURALISM
Why would Britain—or any polity—encourage legal pluralism? Most
theories of the state describe a ruthless quest for uniformity. Charles
Tilly’s landmark study of state formation begins with the following anecdote: “Some 3,800 years ago, [Hammurabi] conquered all the region’s
other city-states, and made them subject to Marduk, his own city’s
god. . . . By conquering, he gained the right and obligation to establish
laws for all the people.”24 For Tilly, states don’t just make war; they also
make uniform laws and cults.25 This tendency persisted in the modern
era.26 Max Weber, for instance, described the development of uniform
rules as one of modernity’s defining attributes.27 And yet, as Brian Tamanaha has observed, “legal pluralism is everywhere.”28 Not only do nonstate norms continue to regulate many aspects of society, but states themselves often administer multiple kinds of law.29 If states lust after legal
uniformity, why do they so rarely attain it?
Existing explanations fall into three broad categories. The first is that
legal pluralism emerges when states are too weak to impose uniform
laws30—or, to switch perspectives, when minority groups are strong
enough to make states recognize their customs.31 The difficulty of

24

Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990, at 1 (1992).
Daryl J. Levinson, Incapacitating the State, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 181, 196 (2014).
26
See, e.g., James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the
Human Condition Have Failed 4–5 (1998).
27
Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 694–704 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). According to Weber, “legal particularisms” persist in
modern law, but only on a contractual basis that the state makes available to all. See Anthony
T. Kronman, Max Weber 108–12 (1983).
28
Tamanaha, supra note 3, at 376.
29
See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 40–41
(1983).
30
See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal
Tradition 38–39 (1983); Jean-Laurent Rosenthal & R. Bin Wong, Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe 32–33 (2011); Richard J. Ross
& Philip Stern, Reconstructing Early Modern Notions of Legal Pluralism, in Legal Pluralism
and Empires, supra note 3, at 109, 112–13; see also Laura F. Edwards, The People and Their
Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South
4–6 (2009) (arguing that in the antebellum American South, “[p]roponents of state law . . . aspired to create a unified body of law” but were frustrated by “relatively weak” state governments).
31
See, e.g., Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 899, 935.
25
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transplanting laws from one culture to another can further strain state capacity.32
A second explanation distinguishes “ordinary” states, which pursue
uniform laws, from empires, which do not.33 For some scholars, this is
just a special version of the state-weakness explanation: empires lack the
strength to impose uniform laws on their colonies.34 Other accounts describe legal pluralism as a benefit that empires enjoy: it is what allows
metropolitan elites to exploit the unhappy periphery.35 Either way, pluralism is part of what makes empires feel imperial.36 To be sure, the contours
32
See William Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20 Duke J.
Comp. & Int’l L. 473, 509 (2010). Comparative lawyers continue to debate the feasibility of
legal transplants. See generally John W. Cairns, Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal
Transplants, 41 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 637, 639 (2013) (describing this debate). One view,
associated especially with Alan Watson, argues that transplantation is usually feasible even
between societies with different cultures or levels of economic development. Alan Watson,
Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 55 (2d ed. 1974). An opposing view,
often ascribed to Montesquieu, insists that because law is rooted in specific cultural or economic conditions, transplantation is typically difficult, impossible, or undesirable. See Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 8–9 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller & Harold S. Stone
eds., 1989) (1748); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2235, 2241–42 (2015) (describing this view). Many scholars
today adopt an intermediate position that seeks to identify the conditions that make successful
transplants possible. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard,
The Transplant Effect, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 163, 189 (2003); Emily Kadens, The Myth of the
Customary Law Merchant, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1153, 1159, 1161–62 (2012).
33
See, e.g., Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective
83 (2008) (“[E]mpires involve not uniformity but diversity of rule.”); Burbank & Cooper,
supra note 1, at 8 (“The concept of empire presumes that different peoples within the polity
will be governed differently.”); Palmer, supra note 3, at 4; cf. Mark J. Roe & Jordan I. Siegel,
Finance and Politics: A Review Essay Based on Kenneth Dam’s Analysis of Legal Traditions
in The Law–Growth Nexus, 47 J. Econ. Literature 781, 785 (2009) (“Britain was running an
empire, not spreading its institutions wherever it could.”).
34
See, e.g., Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion 1560–1660, at 7, 291 (2008); Eliga H. Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The
American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire 27–28 (2012).
35
See, e.g., Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire 349–50 (2008); Timothy Parsons,
The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They
Always Fall 15 (2010).
36
See Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Domestic:
The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in Foreign in a Domestic
Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution 1, 11–12 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (asking why it seems “imperialistic to withhold uniformity”); cf. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History 4 (2004) (“Many staples of the American constitutional
order, such as jury trials, may be poorly suited to the long-term occupation of territories that
have experienced legal traditions that do not employ the full range of Anglo-American institutions. If the Constitution always requires such institutions to be implemented in federal
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of legal pluralism may change over time.37 But legal pluralism of some
sort is simply a fact of imperial life—the existence of which lies mostly
beyond the control of empires themselves.38
Finally, a third group of explanations suggests that legal pluralism
emerges because states believe they have a duty to preserve it.39 That duty
might arise from domestic law,40 international law,41 or other moral commitments,42 particularly those rooted in the Enlightenment.43
These three explanations are not mutually exclusive.44 In fact, they
share a common feature: all three explanations downplay the importance
of political decision-making. States pursue uniformity unless they are empires; until they are frustrated by their own weakness; or until they embrace a commitment to toleration. These explanations certainly explain

territory . . . that could effectively prevent many kinds of acquisitions by making it difficult or
impossible to govern the territory once it is acquired.”).
37
Lauren Benton, for instance, describes an unavoidable transition, beginning in “the late
eighteenth century,” from the “fluid jurisdictional politics” of early modern empires to “statecentered legal pluralism.” Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in
World History, 1400–1900, at 6, 147–49, 259 (2002).
38
See id. at 3 (describing legal pluralism as a “universal feature of the colonial order”).
Explanations that focus on empire have much in common with the “endowment” or “institutional transplants” theory, which seeks to explain why European empires “tried to replicate
European institutions” in some colonies but not others. See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson
& James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 1369, 1370 (2001); Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies, 3 Economía 41, 41–44 (2002). The endowment theory is discussed infra Section V.A.
39
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Redding, Dignity, Legal Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75
Brook. L. Rev. 791, 827–28 (2010).
40
See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1049, 1050
(2007).
41
See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L.
Rev. 1, 166 & n.1144 (2002).
42
See, e.g., Víctor M. Muñiz-Fraticelli, The Structure of Pluralism: On the Authority of
Associations 25–28 (2014).
43
See, e.g., Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force
in International Law and Practice 33–35 (1996); Philip Lawson, The Imperial Challenge: Quebec and Britain in the Age of the American Revolution 139 (1990); Hannah Weiss Muller,
Bonds of Belonging: Subjecthood and the British Empire, 53 J. Brit. Stud. 29, 46 (2014).
44
See, e.g., Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—
and Why They Fall, at xxxiii–iv, 192–227 (2007) (tracing the history of British pluralism and
intolerance in India, and attributing eventual loss of the colony to the failure of pluralism);
P.J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750–
1783, at 205–06 (2005); Oto-Peralías & Romero-Ávila, supra note 5, at 11.
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some instances of legal pluralism.45 But as the following Parts will show,
they fail to account for much of the British Empire’s legal policy.
II. SEEKING A COMMON LAW
The last Part summarized three common explanations for legal pluralism. Those explanations cannot account for early modern Britain’s approach to colonial law. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,
legal pluralism was neither inevitable nor a necessary feature of imperial
rule. From the Restoration in 1660 through the middle of the eighteenth
century, Britain generally tried to extend English law throughout its empire.46 And although some British politicians eventually defended legal
pluralism by appealing to toleration, many eighteenth-century policymakers considered it perfectly tolerant—and consistent with emerging Enlightenment theories of diversity—to impose English law on non-English
subjects.47
A. The Expansion of English Law
English law had a long tradition of pluralism.48 Common law courts,
Chancery, and Admiralty all applied different substantive and procedural
rules,49 and the common law itself made room for local customs.50 At the
45
For example, in ancient Rome, legal pluralism was indeed an inherent part of imperial
rule. See Clifford Ando, Pluralism and Empire: From Rome to Robert Cover, 1 Critical Analysis L. 1, 9 (2014). The legal pluralism of medieval European law resulted in part from the
weakness of monarchs vis-à-vis local lords and the Church. See R.C. van Caenegem, Legal
History: A European Perspective 119 (1991). And constitutional and liberal commitments to
toleration underpin the recognition of religious law in Western democracies today. See, e.g.,
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1231, 1232–35 (2011).
46
See infra Section II.A.
47
See infra Section II.B.
48
See, e.g., 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *64–*92; Hulsebosch, supra note 7, at
58; Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576–1640, at 25–26 (2006).
49
See Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law,
74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1179, 1186–87 (2007).
50
J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century: A Reissue with a Retrospect 30–31 (rev. ed.
1987). For instance, intestate property in Kent passed by gavelkind (a system of partible inheritance), in contrast to the general rule of primogeniture. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire, at xiii (2004); George L. Haskins,
The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the American Colonies, 51 Yale L.J. 1280, 1299
(1942).
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same time, the pursuit of a unified legal system was a crucial element of
early modern English state-building.51 By the eighteenth century, the
Crown, Parliament, and the courts had cabined the power of local customs52 and defined increasingly clear, hierarchical relationships among
England’s many courts.53
England also sought to unify its law geographically, starting with
Wales54 and Ireland.55 (Scotland bucked the trend, as Section B explains.)
Contemporaries generally viewed these extensions of English law as successful. As Sir Edward Coke wrote in 1628, the “union of lawes is the
best meanes for the unity of countries.”56 The Crown was slower to export
English law to the American colonies. Some jurists, including Coke,
raised jurisprudential and political objections to transplanting the common law overseas,57 and at first the English state lacked the capacity to
control the laws of North America.58 But by the end of the seventeenth
51

See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 50, at 31–32; Michael Braddick, State Formation in Early
Modern England, c. 1550–1700, at 55 (2000).
52
See E.P. Thompson, Custom, Law and Common Right, in Customs in Common 97, 97–
98 (1991); see also Haskins, supra note 50, at 1299 (noting sixteenth-century statutes limiting
the scope of Kentish land law); Terry Reilly, King Lear: The Kentish Forest and the Problem
of Thirds, 26 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 379, 383 (2001) (noting “repeated efforts . . . to abolish
gavelkind”). The declining vitality of local custom reflected broader European trends. See
James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?, 58
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1321, 1322 (1991).
53
See John H. Langbein, Renée Lettow Lerner & Bruce P. Smith, History of the Common
Law: The Development of Anglo-American Legal Institutions 196, 334–35, 361–62 (2009);
see also Paul D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire 62–63 (2010) (arguing
that early modern England exhibited “a single legal culture of many intertwined parts”).
54
Laws in Wales Act 1542, 35 Henry 8, c. 26; Laws in Wales Act 1535, 27 Henry 8, c. 26;
Matthew Lockwood, The Conquest of Death: Violence and the Birth of the Modern English
State 34 (2017).
55
Hans S. Pawlisch, Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland: A Study in Legal Imperialism 55 (1985); F.H. Newark, Notes on Irish Legal History, 7 N. Ir. Legal Q. 121, 126
(1947).
56
1 Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England 141.b (London,
Garland Publishing, Inc. 1979) (1628). That maxim was repeated well into the eighteenth century. See, e.g., 1 Robert Chambers, A Course of Lectures on the English Law Delivered at the
University of Oxford 1767–1773, at 276–77 (Thomas M. Curley ed., 1986); Matthew Hale,
The History of the Common Law 58 (Dublin, James Moore 1792) (1713).
57
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward
Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 Law & Hist. Rev. 439, 439, 448–49, 454–58 (2003).
58
See William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America: The Chesapeake and
New England, 1607–1660, at 6–7 (2008). England developed a centralized imperial state only
in the second half of the seventeenth century. Compare Abigail L. Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire: Labor, Slavery, and the Origins of the British Atlantic Empire 32–55 (2015)
(pointing to the Western Design of 1656 as a key moment of centralization), with Steve Pincus
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century, Crown officials and imperial agents had started to bring colonial
laws in line with those of England.59
Much of this work fell to the Privy Council, which heard appeals from
colonial cases. Privy Counsellors recognized that colonial laws would
necessarily diverge from their metropolitan source, in response both to
local conditions and to the perceived needs of a more vigorous royal prerogative on the imperial frontier.60 At the same time, however, the Privy
Council saw English legal protections as a crucial attraction for potential
settlers and as a valuable instrument of centralization.61 Ultimately, the
Privy Council reconciled these concerns by requiring that colonial laws
not be “repugnant” to those of England.62 In doing so, it laid the framework for an often contentious debate about the precise scope of English
liberties abroad—but one that assumed a jurisprudential unity between
England and its colonies.63
This framework applied even to places with substantial non-English
populations, such as New York, which England captured from the Netherlands in 1664.64 Even though the colony’s articles of capitulation had
provided for the limited survival of Dutch law,65 New York’s conquerors
quickly began working to suppress its influence. Limited state capacity
and local resistance sometimes made for slow progress, but “the common
law began to assume primacy [in New York City] within a year of the
English conquest,”66 and by 1691, authorities could declare the common

& James Robinson, Wars and State-Making Reconsidered: The Rise of the Developmental
State, 71 Annales 9, 37 (2016) (arguing that England “became an imperial state” when it created the Board of Trade in 1696).
59
William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America: The Middle Colonies and
the Carolinas, 1660–1730, at 3 (2013).
60
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, English Liberties Outside England: Floors, Doors, Windows, and
Ceilings in the Legal Architecture of Empire, in The Oxford Handbook of English Law and
Literature, 1500–1700, at 747, 766–68 (Lorna Hutson ed., 2017). Of course, the royal prerogative was itself a central part of English law. Id.
61
See William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America: The Chesapeake and
New England, 1660–1750, at 132 (2016); Hulsebosch, supra note 60, at 761–62, 766–67.
62
Bilder, supra note 50, at 2; Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the
American Plantations 656 (1950).
63
See Richard J. Ross, The Career of Puritan Jurisprudence, 26 Law & Hist. Rev. 227, 231–
32 (2008).
64
See Hulsebosch, supra note 7, at 48.
65
Specifically, rules relating to inheritance and the interpretation of preconquest contracts.
Jaap Jacobs, New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth-Century America 103 (Brill
2005).
66
Nelson, supra note 59, at 43–45.
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law fully in force.67 In India, where the East India Company operated
trading settlements at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, the Company
sought to align its courts with English models.68 This effort sometimes
demanded doctrinal innovation. For example, in order to accommodate
testimony by non-Christian litigants, courts had to expand the range of
permissible oaths.69 But British officials generally found it more appealing to modify English law than to restrict the places or parties to which it
applied.
Britain’s ambition of extending English law abroad was not always
fully realized.70 But by the early eighteenth century, the British state had
adopted a policy of seeking to apply English law in all English courts,
whatever their location.71
67
See Herbert A. Johnson, The Advent of Common Law in Colonial New York, in Essays
on New York Colonial Legal History 37, 37–38 (1981).
68
Mitch Fraas, Making Claims: Indian Litigants and the Expansion of the English Legal
World in the Eighteenth Century, 15 J. Colonialism & Colonial Hist. (2014),
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/542520.
69
See id.
70
See, e.g., Gagan D.S. Sood, Sovereign Justice in Precolonial Maritime Asia: The Case of
the Mayor’s Court of Bombay, 1726–1798, 37 Itinerario 46, 55 (2013). When East India Company courts departed from English law, they drew objections both from London lawyers and
from Indian litigants. Compare Petition of the Gentoo Merchants in Bombay ([1746]),
IOR/H/432, at 45, 47–48 (on file with BL) (complaining that the Bombay Mayor’s Court had
ignored English law), with Letter from John Browne, EIC Counsel, to President & Council of
Madras (Feb. 3, 1738), IOR/H/427, at 27–28 (on file with BL) (reminding local officials that
they were bound to apply English law to Indian litigants).
71
By the 1760s, a handful of British possessions—Newfoundland, Gibraltar, and Minorca—
lacked English law. See Jack P. Greene, 1759: The Perils of Success, in Revisiting 1759, supra
note 7, at 95, 97. But these exceptions did not reflect a policy of accepting or encouraging
legal pluralism. Newfoundland was “not a colony but rather a seasonal station for the migratory fishery”; even so, its blend of customary and maritime law “developed within the common
law tradition.” Jerry Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699–1832, at 4, 15 (2003). Gibraltar and Minorca were essentially
military garrisons. Peter Marshall, The Incorporation of Quebec in the British Empire, 1763–
1774, in Of Mother Country and Plantations: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Conference
in Early American History 42, 44 (Virginia Bever Platt & David Curtis Skaggs eds., 1971)
[hereinafter Of Mother Country and Plantations]; cf. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 36, at
203 (“[S]mall territories, such as Guam, Wake, and Midway, whose acquisition [by the United
States] can be constitutionally validated by the naval power [of U.S. Const. art. I, § 8], are not
the stuff of which colonial empires are made.”). Minorca did have a sizable civilian population
governed by Spanish law, but British observers treated that situation as the regrettable consequence of the island’s terms of cession in 1713, and they periodically proposed ways to anglicize local courts. See Desmond Gregory, Minorca, the Illusory Prize: A History of the British
Occupation of Minorca Between 1708 and 1802, at 86 (1990); Stephen Conway, The Consequences of Conquest: Quebec and British Politics, 1760–1774, in Revisiting 1759, supra note
7, at 141, 147–48.
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B. Legal Uniformity in an Age of Enlightenment
The story so far has focused on the period up to the 1740s. Some scholars have described that decade as a turning point in European thinking
about legal pluralism. In particular, the publication in 1748 of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1748) is supposed to have inspired a new skepticism about transplanting laws from one society to another.72 Perhaps the
influence of Montesquieu, and of sociological jurisprudence more
broadly, explains Britain’s turn toward legal pluralism in the second half
of the eighteenth century?
This Section suggests not. To the contrary, many of the Britons who
were most familiar with Montesquieu’s work in the 1740s and early 1750s
continued to believe that English law could productively anglicize in the
British Empire. This belief was on full display in efforts to anglicize Scots
law in the 1740s, and it remained a common premise of debates about
legal pluralism after the Seven Years’ War. To be sure, Montesquieu’s
work did shape eighteenth-century discussions of legal pluralism,73 but it
was not enough to inspire Britain’s change in policy.74
Some of the earliest British readings of Spirit of the Laws came in the
context of efforts to forge a more thoroughgoing union between England
and Scotland. Between 1603, when the Scottish and English crowns were
joined in the person of James VI/I, and 1707, when the two kingdoms
formed a legislative union, politicians repeatedly tried to unify English
and Scots laws.75 When those efforts failed, English politicians decided
that they could accept the survival of Scots law because it had already
started to converge with that of England.76 Parliament periodically tried

72

See Tamanaha, supra note 32, at 2241–44.
See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Place and Time (1782), in Selected Writings 152, 156 n.(a)
(Stephen G. Engelmann ed., 2011) (describing The Spirit of the Laws as a watershed for imperial lawmaking).
74
Cf. Richard Bourke, Edmund Burke and the Politics of Conquest, 4 Mod. Intell. Hist. 403,
422 (2007) (showing that Montesquieu influenced Edmund Burke’s approach to legal pluralism, but that Burke ultimately rejected some of Montesquieu’s conclusions). Commentators
have often observed that Montesquieu’s work can lend itself to varied interpretations. See,
e.g., Jacob T. Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom 147 (2015).
75
See Brian P. Levack, The Proposed Union of English Law and Scots Law in the Seventeenth Century, 20 Jurid. Rev. 97, 97 (1975); A.J. MacLean, The 1707 Union: Scots Law and
the House of Lords, 4 J. Legal Hist. 50, 67–68 (1983).
76
See J.D. Ford, The Legal Provisions in the Acts of Union, 66 Cambridge L.J. 106, 117,
139–40 (2007).
73
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to hasten the process,77 but it generally accepted that Scots law was there
to stay.
In the 1740s, however, many British politicians reconsidered their toleration of Scottish legal pluralism. A failed Jacobite rebellion in 1745 had
enjoyed disproportionate support in Scotland,78 and the British ministry
concluded that the surest way to prevent future uprisings was to integrate
Scotland more fully with England.79 In part, that meant anglicizing Scots
law.80 The ministry’s proposals included abolishing feudal courts;81 eliminating feudal land tenures;82 and introducing English-style grand juries,83
circuit courts,84 and evidentiary rules.85 These were relatively minor
changes, but reformers described them as the first step toward a broader
harmonization of British law. “I think it impossible for England and Scotland to be on a Right Foot” until they are on the “same Foot” with respect
to “Law & Courts & the Administration of Justice,” wrote one Scottish
lawyer who supported the reforms.86 A leading English statesman called
this program a “Battle for our Constitution.”87 For Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, it was nothing less than a “Scotch Reformation.”88

77

See, e.g., Treason Act 1708, 7 Ann. c. 21 (“Whereas nothing can more conduce to the
improving the Union of the Two Kingdom [sic] . . . than that the Laws of both Parts of Great
Britain should agree . . . .”).
78
After the Glorious Revolution of 1688 forced James II into exile, his followers, known as
Jacobites, periodically tried to regain the throne for him and his successors. See Daniel Szechi,
The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688–1788, at xxii, 12 (1994).
79
See Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837, at 83–84 (2d ed. 1992); Allan
I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788, at 217–21 (1996).
80
For the connection between legal pluralism and the 1745 rebellion, see Gould, supra note
34, at 27.
81
Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act 1746, 20 Geo. 2 c. 43.
82
The Tenures Abolition Act 1746, 20 Geo. 2 c. 50, abolished some feudal tenures, but
others survived until 2004. See Abolition of Feudal Tenure (Scotland) Act 2000, (ASP 5).
83
Charles Erskine, Lord Tinwald, The Alterations Proposed to Be Made in the Criminal
Law of Scotland (Jan. 21, 1747), Add MS 35446, at 127 (on file with BL).
84
Lord Hardwicke, Speech to the House of Lords (Feb. 17, 1747), in 14 The Parliamentary
History of England, from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, at 9, 18 (William Cobbett ed.,
London, T.C. Hansard 1813) [hereinafter Parliamentary History].
85
Specifically, abolishing the requirement that evidence in capital cases be reduced to writing. Id. at 25.
86
Letter from James Erskine, Lord Grange, to Lord Hardwicke (Mar. 1, 1747), Add MS
35446, at 148 (on file with BL).
87
Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727–1783, at 217–18 (1998).
88
Letter from Lord Hardwicke to Duke of Cumberland (Apr. 16, 1747), Add MS 35589, at
211r (on file with BL).
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Although some Scottish elites objected to this program,89 others
praised it as embodying Enlightenment theories of law and society.90 The
Scottish lawyer Sir John Dalrymple, for example, described Hardwicke’s
efforts as epitomizing the ideas of government that Montesquieu had recently expounded. Those ideas, Dalrymple suggested, led him to advocate
for a greater unity between English and Scots law.91 The Scottish judge
Lord Kames, who, like Dalrymple, praised Montesquieu as “the greatest
genius of the present age,”92 considered it “an unhappy circumstance, that
different parts of the same kingdom should be governed by different
laws.”93 To be sure, Dalrymple and Kames both warned Parliament
against immediately legislating legal uniformity.94 But they also suggested that judges should help Scots law “decay by degrees” until it more
closely resembled that of England.95
When reformers like Dalrymple and Kames considered the relationship
between law and society, their principal conclusion was not that local conditions demanded the preservation of Scots law, but that laws and other
institutions could reshape Scotland’s customs, economy, and even

89
See Bob Harris, Politics and the Nation: Britain in the Mid-Eighteenth Century 14 (2002);
Colin Kidd, Union and Unionisms: Political Thought in Scotland, 1500–2000, at 178–89, 210
(2008).
90
See, e.g., Letter from David Hume to Montesquieu (Apr. 10, 1749), in 1 The Letters of
David Hume 133, 134 (J.Y.T. Greig ed., 1969) (1932).
91
When Dalrymple wrote a history of feudal law in Britain, he described his project as
seeking to show “how much greater [the] similarity [between Scots and English law] might
yet be made.” Letter from Sir John Dalrymple to Lord Hardwicke (Feb. 14, 1756), Add MS
35449, at 91 (on file with BL). Dalrymple took his epigraph from The Spirit of the Laws, called
Montesquieu “the greatest genius of our age,” and emphasized that Montesquieu himself had
provided feedback on the project. John Dalrymple, Essay Towards a General History of Feudal Property in Great Britain, at iv (4th ed. London, A. Millar 1759); see also Letter from Sir
John Dalrymple of Cousland, 4th baronet, to Charles Yorke, Solicitor Gen. (Apr. 12, 1757),
Add MS 35635, at 100 (on file with BL) (noting the assistance Dalrymple received “from the
late President Montesquieu”).
92
1 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Sketches of the History of Man 163 (James A. Harris ed.,
2007) (1788).
93
Henry Home, Lord Kames, Historical Law-Tracts, at xii (2d ed. Edinburgh, Printed by A.
Kinkaid for A. Millar, A. Kincaid & J. Bell 1761). For similarities between Kames’s and
Montesquieu’s approaches, see David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined:
Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain 147–49 (1989).
94
Dalrymple, supra note 91, at viii–ix; Kames, supra note 93, at xii.
95
Dalrymple, supra note 91, at ix; see also Lieberman, supra note 93, at 159–60 (explaining
Kames’s preference for judicial rather than legislative change); Peter Stein, Legal Evolution:
The Story of an Idea 25 (1980) (describing Kames, Dalrymple, and Charles Yorke as writing
to support the unification of English and Scots law).
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climate.96 “Mankind are undoubtedly the same in their natural State in
every Climate, every Country, and every Age,” the politician John Perceval observed.97 “It is their respective constitutions or different modes of
government which create all the difference that can be found between one
Nation and another . . . .”98 Instead of treating racial, cultural, or environmental factors as rigid determinants of human difference, British commentators instead looked to law and government as potentially transformative.99
This point bears emphasizing. Scholars have rightly highlighted the
centrality of racism and racial categories for colonialism, and especially
for shaping British colonial law.100 But in the 1760s and 1770s, many
British officials took a more flexible view of the difference between European and non-European populations.101 The well-connected colonial
administrator Maurice Morgann made this clear in a proposal he prepared
for the gradual emancipation of slaves. Although Morgann posited a “corporeal distinction” between Europeans and Africans, he insisted that “experience, and the nature of man . . . forbid us to suppose that there is any
original or essential difference in the mental part.”102 For Morgann, this
mix of mental similarity and physical diversity offered Britain a unique
opportunity. Because Africans fared better than Europeans in hot climates, Morgann argued, Britain should turn over its southern colonies to
free black subjects, who would occupy roles identical to those of their
white counterparts to the north. Morgann’s plan hinged on the ability of
shared institutions to elide racial differences: white and black subjects
“will talk the same language, read the same books, profess the same

96
See Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, Enlightenment’s Frontier: The Scottish Highlands and the
Origins of Environmentalism 69–89 (2013).
97
John Perceval [later 2d Earl of Egmont], Draft of a Speech on the Proposed Feudal Tenures Bill ([1746?]), Add MS 47097, at 1, 2 (on file with BL).
98
Id.
99
See Dror Wahrman, The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth
Century England 86–87 (2004).
100
See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolsky, Colonial Justice in British India: White Violence and the
Rule of Law 4–5 (2010); Kunal M. Parker, The Historiography of Difference, 23 Law & Hist.
Rev. 685, 688 (2005).
101
Cf. Jennifer Pitts, Empire and Legal Universalisms in the Eighteenth Century, 117 Am.
Hist. Rev. 92, 95 (2012) (noting the “striking openness” of eighteenth-century thinkers “to the
possibility of shared legal frameworks and mutual obligations between Christians and nonChristians, Europeans and non-Europeans”).
102
[Maurice Morgann], A Plan for the Abolition of Slavery in the West Indies 5 (London,
William Griffin 1772).
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religion, and be fashioned by the same laws . . . .”103 Like Hardwicke’s
“Scotch Reformation,” Morgann’s proposal assumed that English institutions could transform anyone, anywhere, into “assimilated, productive,
loyal Britons.”104
Not everyone shared Morgann’s faith in institutions. By the 1760s,
some writers had already started to assert more rigid racial categories.105
Nonetheless, shortly before Britain adopted a policy of legal pluralism in
Quebec and Bengal, some of Britain’s most prominent judges, lawyers,
and politicians believed that it was possible, prudent, and just to impose
English law on non-English subjects.
III. LEGAL POLICY AND COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT
Until the middle of the eighteenth century, Britain pursued a unified
imperial law. The details of that law differed by jurisdiction, but lawyers
and litigants across the empire saw themselves as participating in a common jurisprudence and a shared set of institutions. That changed in the
1760s. During the Seven Years’ War, Britain conquered several territories
from France and Spain, and shortly afterwards, the East India Company
gained control of the taxes and civil administration (diwani) of Bengal.106
In most of these new colonies—Senegal, the Ceded Islands, and the Floridas—Britain continued its earlier policy of transplanting English law.107
But in Bengal, the East India Company began administering Hindu and
Islamic law,108 a policy that Parliament later confirmed.109 In Quebec,
103

Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
See Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism 219
(2006).
105
See Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America
116–23 (2008) (arguing that a category of “whiteness” began to emerge in North America in
the 1760s); Kathleen Wilson, Rethinking the Colonial State: Family, Gender, and Governmentality in Eighteenth-Century British Frontiers, 116 Am. Hist. Rev. 1294, 1315–16 (2011)
(describing shifting racial distinctions in the British West Indies). Compare F.T.H. Fletcher,
Montesquieu and English Politics (1750–1800), at 95–96 (1939) (noting David Hume’s emphasis on the primacy of institutions over climate in the 1740s), with Silvia Sebastiani, Hume
versus Montesquieu: Race Against Climate, in The Scottish Enlightenment: Race, Gender,
and the Limits of Progress 23, 24 (2013) (showing that in the early 1750s, Hume tempered his
emphasis on institutions by suggesting “polygenetic differentiation between human groups”).
106
See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
107
See infra Section III.B.
108
Travers, supra note 7, at 117–18.
109
The Regulating Act, 1773, 13 Geo. 3 c. 63, authorized the Crown to establish in Calcutta
a Supreme Court of Judicature (§ 13), which was to have jurisdiction only over “British Subjects” (§ 14) and others who voluntarily consented to its jurisdiction (§ 16). After conflicts
104
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Britain initially imposed English law, but in 1774 Parliament passed the
Quebec Act, which restored French civil law while leaving English criminal law in place.110 In short, Britain inaugurated a limited policy of legal
pluralism.111
Britain’s change in policy reflected a new set of development priorities.112 Policymakers believed that colonies that enjoyed English law
erupted over the court’s jurisdiction, Parliament passed another statute in 1781 clarifying that
India would have a “dual judicial system” and further limiting the reach of English law. M.P.
Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal History 120–29 (3d ed. 1972).
110
The Quebec Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3 c. 83, § 11 (repealed 1791), had four other major
provisions. First, it accommodated Quebec’s Catholic majority by guaranteeing toleration of
Catholicism in the colony and codifying the Catholic Church’s right to collect tithes. Id. § 5.
Second, the Act restored the seigneurial, i.e., feudal, system of land tenure, abrogating the
British township system that had been erected in 1763. Id. §§ 8, 10. Third, the Act provided
for a Crown-appointed governor, who would govern with an appointed legislative council—
but not an elected assembly. Id. § 12. Finally, the Act expanded Quebec’s boundaries to include much of present-day Ontario, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Id. § 1.
111
The nature of legal pluralism varied by colony. Bengal operated on a “parallel jurisdictional model” that sought to segregate Europeans from Indians. In contrast, all inhabitants of
Quebec were subject to an “integrated” model that combined English criminal law and French
civil law. The difference between parallel and integrated models of legal pluralism can have
important implications for subsequent development outcomes. For instance, Ronald Daniels,
Michael Trebilcock, and Lindsey Carson argue that modern rule-of-law outcomes in former
British colonies depend partly on the extent to which indigenous and English law were integrated into a single system. Daniels et al., supra note 6, at 156–73. Daniels et al. express no
view as to why Britain might have adopted different policies for each colony. See id. at 129
n.68.
112
Britain’s turn toward legal pluralism had earlier roots. In the 1740s, Tories and conservative Whigs began to express some of the same concerns that later drove Tories to favor legal
pluralism. In particular, many politicians began to worry that British society had grown licentious and disorderly. See Sarah Kinkel, Disorder, Discipline, and Naval Reform in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain, 128 Eng. Hist. Rev. 1451, 1460 (2013). Around the same time, some
East India Company officials began campaigning to exclude Indian litigants from Company
courts, with limited success. See Arthur Mitchell Fraas, “They Have Travailed Into a Wrong
Latitude”: The Laws of England, Indian Settlements, and the British Imperial Constitution
1726–1773, 336–81 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University), http://hdl.handle.net/10161/3954 [https://perma.cc/C4DX-M5YL]. It was only in the 1760s, however, that
calls to limit the reach of English law achieved widespread political appeal or practical effect.
In part, this reflected the growing strength of radical Whiggery during the 1760s, which led
Tories to seek new ways to restore order to the empire. See Justin du Rivage, Revolution
Against Empire: Taxes, Politics, and the Origins of American Independence 78–82 (2017);
Vaughn, supra note 18, at 379. Around the same time, changes in the nature of commerce gave
courts a more salient role in governing economic transactions, so that legal policy became an
increasingly effective way to manipulate political-economic outcomes. See Christian R. Burset, A Common Law? Legal Pluralism in the Eighteenth-Century British Empire 178–237
(2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). These changes occurred just as Britain conquered several new colonies—
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would grow to resemble England itself, including its vibrant commercial
economy and robust public sphere. Legally plural colonies, however,
would become politically docile and develop extractive economies. Legal
pluralism’s political-economic implications made it controversial, and the
preservation of Hindu and Islamic law in Bengal and of French law in
Quebec depended on the outcome of a divisive political contest between
rival parties with conflicting ideas about what kind of colonies Britain
should foster.113 In contrast, the decision to extend English law to the
Floridas, the West Indies, and Senegal was uncontroversial because politicians broadly agreed about what kind of colonies they should become.114
A. The Purpose of Legal Pluralism
Legal pluralism in Bengal and Quebec emerged from a fight between
Tories and Whigs about the future of the British Empire.115 In eighteenth-

a confluence of events that offered a uniquely potent opportunity to deploy legal pluralism as
a policy tool.
113
See infra Section III.0.
114
See infra Section III.B.
115
A note on partisan labels. Eighteenth-century writers did not always agree about how to
describe political divisions. In part, this was because they disagreed about what it meant to
belong to a party. See, e.g., Richard Bourke, Empire & Revolution: The Political Life of Edmund Burke 196–97 (2015) (contrasting Bolingbroke’s view of parties as evil with Burke’s
account of “party [as] a means of principled association”); John Brewer, Party Ideology and
Popular Politics at the Accession of George III 39–47 (1976). In addition, party labels changed
their meaning over the course of the century. See Ian R. Christie, Party in Politics in the Age
of Lord North’s Administration, 6 Parliamentary Hist. 47, 49–50 (1987). Accordingly, the
labels used here reflect recent historiography rather than contemporary usage, although contemporaries would have recognized the groups these labels describe.
Historians have identified three ideological coalitions that structured politics in later-eighteenth-century Britain. The first, known as “radical Whigs” or “Patriots,” included the leaders
of the American Revolution and sympathetic Britons like William Pitt (later the Earl of Chatham). The second group, known as “establishment” or “moderate” Whigs, was led in the late
1760s and 1770s by the second Marquess of Rockingham; Edmund Burke was its intellectual
heavyweight. Finally, there was a coalition that historians have variously dubbed “authoritarian reformers,” “authoritarian Whigs,” or “neo-Tories.” Its adherents included Lord Chief Justice Mansfield and George Grenville, who crafted the Stamp Act. See Sarah Kinkel, The
King’s Pirates? Naval Enforcement of Imperial Authority, 1740–76, 71 Wm. & Mary Q. 3, 8–
10 (2014); Vaughn, supra note 18, at 5. In general, radical and establishment Whigs were
skeptical of legal pluralism, while neo-Tories supported it. Accordingly, this Article often
lumps together the first two groups as “Whigs.” See Welland, supra note 7, at 177 (discussing
the alliance on Quebec policy between Chatham and Rockingham as well as the development
of “new Whigs,” which included both men’s factions). This Article uses “Tory” for the third
group because the “authoritarian” label, while accurate, may inspire misleading comparisons
to more recent authoritarian regimes.
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century Britain, parties were loose coalitions, each of which had a distinctive colonial agenda.116 As in the present-day United States, parties were
not ideologically uniform, but their members shared many of the same
goals and commitments.117 These partisan divisions shaped eighteenthcentury debates about colonial law.
Tories took a pessimistic view of Britain’s recent history. Although
Britain had just defeated France and Spain in a global war, Tories worried
that the conflict had left Britain fiscally and morally exhausted. Taxes
were too low, spending was too high, and society had lost its respect for
authority. To remedy these ills, Tories proposed a wide-ranging restoration of fiscal, social, and political discipline.118 Their program depended
on extracting as much revenue as possible from Britain’s colonists while
keeping them too weak to challenge London’s supremacy.119
Whigs worried less about colonial power. They believed that the empire’s prosperity depended on colonists’ ability to buy British manufactured goods. Accordingly, Whigs wanted to maximize the wealth and
number of Britain’s colonial subjects.120 Whigs agreed with Tories that
unfettered growth might eventually make colonial subjects too rich to
control,121 but Whigs either dismissed that concern as too far-off to worry

116
See, e.g., du Rivage, supra note 112, at 13–15. Although this Article often focuses on the
words and actions of political elites, eighteenth-century parties attracted—and depended on—
popular support. See, e.g., Linda Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714–60,
at 146–74 (1982); Kathleen Wilson, The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785 (1995).
117
See, e.g., Steve Pincus, The Heart of the Declaration: The Founders’ Case for an Activist
Government 16 (2016).
118
See Kinkel, supra note 112, at 1458–59.
119
See du Rivage, supra note 112, at 15–16; infra notes 159–162 and accompanying text.
120
Pincus, supra note 117, at 25–50; see, e.g., Letter from Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the N. Dep’t, to Henry Seymour Conway ([1763?]), Shelburne Papers, vol. 48, folder 6, at 67 (on file with WLCL) (“[T]he great object in every Colony is the
encouraging Population . . . .”); id. at 73 (connecting population growth to the consumption of
British manufactured goods); Letter from Phineas Lyman to Lord Shelburne ([after Aug.
1766]), Shelburne Papers, vol. 50, at 131–34 (on file with WLCL).
121
See, e.g., Phineas Lyman, Plan Proposed by Gen. Phineas Lyman, for Settling La., and
for Erecting New Colonies Between West Fla. and the Falls of St. Anthony ([1763–69]), Shelburne Papers, vol. 50, at 170–71 (on file with WLCL).
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about122 or looked forward to a more republican empire in which all members carried equal political weight.123
Tories and Whigs had very different priorities, but they agreed that legal policy would shape colonial development. Just as Kames, Dalrymple,
and Hardwicke had argued in the 1740s and 1750s that English law could
help anglicize Scotland, policymakers after the Seven Years’ War continued to believe that the presence or absence of English law would play a
decisive role in setting the course of newly acquired colonies. In the words
of one Whig pamphlet, Britain’s North American colonies had flourished
partly thanks to “the Influence of . . . English Liberty and Laws.”124 If
Britain wanted Bengal and Quebec to develop along the same lines, then
English law was the answer. Legal pluralism, in contrast, would contribute to the Tory model of empire in three ways. First, diverse laws would
divide colonial populations from each other and thus make them easier to
control. Second, the absence of English legal protections would help imperial officials enforce a sense of hierarchy and obedience. Finally, legal
boundaries would discourage the immigration and investment needed to
develop commercial economies.
1. Divide and Rule
For Tories, the first advantage of legal pluralism was that it would divide colonial subjects from each other and from their potential British allies, thus fragmenting colonial politics and inhibiting resistance to metropolitan control.125 In India, this meant separating Muslims from Hindus
and Indians from Europeans. In Quebec, it meant isolating Canadians
from other North Americans.
Eighteenth-century commentators recognized divide-and-rule as a
well-worn tactic of imperial control.126 Francis Maseres, Quebec’s
122
E.g., Memorandum from [Maurice Morgann] to Lord Shelburne 148, 150 ([1766?]),
Shelburne Papers, vol. 168, box 2 (on file with WLCL) (stating that unfettered economic
growth in North America “will be at last destructive of the Mother Country but the Period is
so Distant that it is not an object of Policy”); Lyman, supra note 121, at 170–71.
123
See du Rivage, supra note 112, at 44–51.
124
Party Spirit in Time of Publick Danger, Considered 3 (London, T. Waller 1756). Neither
Whigs nor Tories assumed that a colony’s legal system alone was the only relevant force in
shaping its development. See, e.g., id.
125
Cf. Benton, supra note 37, at 12–15 (noting the power of jurisdictional divisions to reinforce cultural boundaries).
126
See, e.g., Benjamin Franklin, The Interest of Great Britain Considered 39–44 (London,
T. Becket 1760); Henry Fox, Speech in the House of Commons (Dec. 16, 1754), in 1
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attorney general, thought it obvious that if Quebec retained “laws and customs considerably different from those of the neighbouring Colonies,” it
would make it harder for Canadians to “Join with those Colonies in rejecting the Supremacy of the Mother country.”127 But while Maseres came
to see such disunion as troubling,128 Tories embraced it as a tool of colonial discipline. Canada would be most useful to Britain, argued its Tory
governor, if that colony remained “not united in any common principle,
interest, or wish with the other Provinces.”129 One politician noted with
approval that the “political separation of Canada from the rest of America
might be a means of dividing their interests” from those of their southern
neighbors.130 “[D]o you wish . . . to combine the heart of the Canadian
with that of the Bostonian?” asked Sir William Meredith.131 In the wake
of the Boston Tea Party, his answer was no.
Tories offered similar arguments for legal pluralism in Bengal. Diversity of sect and caste, observed one senior East India Company employee,
had facilitated Bengal’s conquest and “prevent[ed] [Indians’] uniting to
fling off the yoke” of foreign rule.132 Another Company employee explained this argument’s implications for legal policy. Although he professed discomfort with creating “a most odious & invidious distinction”
based on legal difference, he insisted on the “necessity that all British
subjects in India . . . be separated from the native inhabitants” by keeping
each religion under a distinct legal system. 133 Otherwise, he warned, “the

Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, 1754–1783,
at 33, 35 (R.C. Simmons & P.D.G. Thomas eds., 1982) [hereinafter Proceedings and Debates].
127
Letter from Francis Maseres to Richard Sutton, Under-Sec’y of State for the S. Dep’t
(Aug. 14, 1768), in The Maseres Letters, 1766–1768, at 101, 110 (W. Stewart Wallace ed.,
1919) [hereinafter Maseres to Sutton].
128
See Francis Maseres, Statement to the House of Commons (June 2, 1774), in 5 Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 18, 21.
129
Letter from Guy Carleton, Governor of Quebec, to Lord Hillsborough, Sec’y of State for
the Colonies (Nov. 20, 1768), in 1 Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759–1791, at 325, 326 (Adam Shortt & Arthur G. Doughty eds., 2d ed. 1918) [hereinafter Constitutional History].
130
Lord Lyttelton, Speech in the House of Lords (June 17, 1774), in 5 Proceedings and
Debates, supra note 126, at 230, 231.
131
[William Meredith], A Letter to the Earl of Chatham, on the Quebec Bill 35 (London, T.
Cadell 2d ed. 1774).
132
Luke Scrafton, Reflections on the Government of Indostan 26 (London, reprinted by W.
Strahan for G. Kearsley & T. Cadell 1770) (1763).
133
Memorandum from James Grant to Lord Shelburne, State of the British Affairs in India
(Nov. 30, 1780), Shelburne Papers, vol. 99, at 301, 340 (on file with WLCL).
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unaccustomed dangerous draught” of English law “must infallibly produce intoxication & turn into a curse & our own destruction.”134
Whigs agreed with Tories that legal pluralism would isolate Canada
and Bengal—which is why they insisted that Britain should bring those
colonies under English law.135 One law for all, Whigs argued, would both
acknowledge the equality of all British subjects and effect new subjects’
assimilation.136 For example, the merchant William Bolts insisted that because Indians and Europeans in Bengal were equally “British subjects”
and “members of the same body-politic,” they deserved the protection of
the same laws.137 Similarly, an anonymous opponent of the Quebec Act
argued that introducing English law to Canada would “make the rising
generation look upon themselves as Englishmen.”138 In making these arguments, Whigs pointed to the histories of Wales and Ireland, which became “happily united with” England after receiving “the laws of the conquerors.”139 In contrast, the preservation of Indian and French laws would
serve only to perpetuate the differences between Britain’s new and old
subjects.140
2. Preserving Hierarchy
Legal pluralism operated partly through the mere fact of legal difference. But Tories were also attracted to the substance of French, Hindu,
and Islamic laws, which seemed especially well suited to producing the
134

Id.
See, e.g., Benjamin Franklin, Notes on Britain’s Intention to Enslave America ([1774–
75?]), in 21 The Papers of Benjamin Franklin 608, 608 (William B. Willcox ed., 1978).
136
See, e.g., Charles James Fox, Speech in the House of Commons (May 26, 1774), in 4
Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 471, 471 (opposing the Quebec Act because it
frustrated his goal of “mak[ing] Englishmen mix as much as possible with the Canadians”).
137
William Bolts, Considerations on India Affairs, at iii (London, J. Almon, P. Elmsly, &
Brotherton & Sewell 2d ed. 1772); see also id. at iv (“In speaking of British subjects, we would
be understood to mean his Majesty’s newly-acquired Asiatic subjects, as well as the British
emigrants residing and established in India.”).
138
A Letter to Sir William Meredith, Bart., in Answer to His Late Letter to the Earl of
Chatham 26–27 (London, G. Kearsly 1774) [hereinafter Letter to Sir William Meredith].
139
John Glynn, Speech in the House of Commons (May 26, 1774), in 4 Proceedings and
Debates, supra note 126, at 463, 464. Whigs and Tories disagreed about how quickly England
had imposed its law on Ireland and Wales, with each party interpreting the historical record to
favor its own cause. See Bourke, supra note 74, at 415–20.
140
See, e.g., Articles of Association (Oct. 20, 1774), in 1 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 75, 76 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904) (warning that “civil [law]
principles” would “dispose the inhabitants [of Quebec] to act with hostility against” the other
American colonies).
135
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kind of hierarchical society that Tories prized. During the 1760s, radical
Whigs in England and the American colonies had become adept at using
the common law—and especially jury trials—to advance their political
agenda.141 Tories worried that English law might communicate this same
tendency towards radicalism to Bengal and Quebec. In contrast, retaining
preconquest legal systems would preserve what Tories perceived as Indians and French Canadians’ habits of obedience.
Tory officials throughout the empire praised non-English legal systems
as conducive to maintaining order. French law in Quebec, reported its
Tory governor, had “established Subordination, from the first to the lowest” and “secured Obedience to the Supreme Seat of Government from a
very distant Province.”142 Attorney General Edward Thurlow agreed: under French law, “all orders of men habitually and perfectly knew their
respective places . . . .”143 This same principle applied in India. When one
colonial governor suggested that Britain use African soldiers in Bengal,
he advised that “[l]aws similar to those they were used to in their own
Country . . . will make them . . . True, Faithful, and Obedient to Command.”144 By allowing African soldiers “in civil matters to be tried by
each other,” he continued, Britain “will always keep them in a State of
Dependance [sic].”145
English law, in contrast, would produce “an excess of licentiousness.”146 Harry Verelst, the onetime governor of Bengal, warned that introducing English law would “instantly emancipate [Indians] from subjection to” Britain.147 An anonymous pamphleteer agreed: English law
would “introduce[] a Levelling Principle among People accustomed to the

141

See John Brewer, The Wilkites and the Law, 1763–74: A Study of Radical Notions of
Governance, in An Ungovernable People: The English and Their Law in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries 128, 139–47 (John Brewer & John Styles eds., 1980); Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England,
75 Cornell L. Rev. 497, 583–89 (1990).
142
Letter from Guy Carleton to Lord Shelburne (Dec. 24, 1767), in 1 Constitutional History,
supra note 129, at 288, 289.
143
Edward Thurlow, Report of the Attorney General (Jan. 22, 1773), in 1 Constitutional
History, supra note 129, at 437, 437.
144
John Roberts, Governor of Cape Coast Castle, Observations Relative to Sending Negroe
Soldiers to [India] (Apr. 20, 1771), Add MS 38397, at 166, 171 (on file with BL).
145
Id. at 170–71.
146
Lyttelton, supra note 130, at 231.
147
Harry Verelst, A View of the Rise, Progress, and Present State of the English Government in Bengal 144 (London, J. Nourse [and three others] 1772).
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most rigid Subordination of Rank and Character . . . .”148 When exposed
to English institutions, officials in Calcutta warned, Indian natives “gradually acquire an independent and untractable [sic] Spirit.”149 The best
“remedy for these evils” was to govern Indians under their own laws.150
The emancipatory power of English law came partly from juries, which
often asserted a political as well as a judicial role.151 Quebec’s grand jury,
for instance, claimed “a right to be consulted, before any Ordinance . . . be
pass’d into a Law.”152 Unsurprisingly, these political pretensions often led
to conflict between grand jurors and governmental officials.153 Civil juries
could also act politically, particularly in suits alleging official misconduct.154 General Thomas Gage, the Tory military commander in North
America, warned that it was too easy for an agitator motivated by “spite
and malice” to promote “frivolous and vexatious Suits against the Officers, who were carrying on the King’s Service.”155 It was bad enough that
colonial juries could second-guess the actions of imperial officials. But it
148
Observations Upon the Administration of Justice in Bengal Occasioned by Some Late
Proceedings at Dacca 8 ([London, n.p.] [1778]).
149
Letter from President & Council of Ft. William to EIC Court of Dirs. (Jan. 6, 1773),
IOR/E/4/31, at 227, 231 (on file with BL).
150
Id. at 232; see also George Rous, EIC Counsel, Legal Opinion (Jan. 5, 1781),
IOR/L/L/7/287 (on file with BL) (“It may then deserve consideration what distinction should
be made between whites & their black slaves [in the EIC outpost on St. Helena], for to give
them equally the benefit of English laws would be to abolish the relation of master & slave.”).
151
Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 94–96 (1998)
(describing eighteenth-century views of “jurors as political participants”).
152
Presentments of the Grand Jury of Quebec (Oct. 16, 1764), in 1 Constitutional History,
supra note 129, at 212, 213.
153
See Lawson, supra note 43, at 51–52; Hilda Neatby, Quebec: The Revolutionary Age,
1760–1791, at 37, 127–28 (1966); Letter from Warren Hastings to Laurence Sulivan (Feb. 1,
1770), Add MS 29126, at 10, 13 (on file with BL) (describing how the grand jury of Madras
had thrown “the civil part of the colony in[to] a violent fury”).
154
See Brewer, supra note 141, at 144–46, 154; cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 63, 76
(2012) (noting that tort suits were the normal remedy for official misconduct in the eighteenth
century); James E. Pfander, Constitutional Torts and the War on Terror 3–6 (2017) (same).
American colonists had an especially strong sense of juries as political institutions. See, e.g.,
Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil
Jury Trial, 22 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 811, 817–18 (2014); John Adams, Diary Entry (Feb.
12, 1771), in 2 Diary and Autobiography of John Adams 3 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1964) (“As
the Constitution requires, that, the popular Branch of the Legislature, should have an absolute
Check so as to put a peremptory Negative upon every Act of the Government, it requires that
the common People should have as compleat a Controul, as decisive a Negative, in every
Judgment of a Court of Judicature.”).
155
Letter from Thomas Gage to Henry Bouquet, Commander of the S. Dep’t (June 2, 1765),
Gage Papers, vol. AS 36 (on file with WLCL).
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would be even worse if jury service led to other forms of political consciousness. “[I]f the natives [of India] should be actually endowed with
the real cap of liberty in the jury room,” warned one pamphlet, “there is
danger, nay, there is a certainty, that they would make bold to wear it
elsewhere; and then, adieu to the English dominion in Bengal.”156 The
safest thing, Tories insisted, was to stop Canadians and Indians from
learning too much about self-government by preventing them from having juries in the first place.
3. Economic Dependence
Finally, Tories believed that legal pluralism would make Quebec and
Bengal more economically dependent on Britain and more economically
useful to the rest of the empire.157 This meant different things in different
places. In Quebec, Tories focused on suppressing manufacturing, while
in Bengal, their chief concern was to facilitate tax collection.158 In both
colonies, however, Tories believed that the combination of legal difference and the absence of English legal protections would put local economies on a different economic trajectory from the one taken by older North
American colonies.
Tories argued that suppressing manufacturing in North America was
essential to preventing its independence. American-made products not
only competed with British goods; they also enabled a dangerous degree
of self-sufficiency by empowering Americans to boycott British manufactures.159 If Britain was to maintain control, General Gage insisted, it
had to end Americans’ efforts to “manufacture for themselves.”160
“Surely,” Gage continued, “the people in England can never be such
dupes to believe that the Americans have traded with them so long out of
pure Love, and Brotherly Affection.”161 Americans bought British goods
because they had no choice, and British policies had to keep it that way.
156

The Present State of the British Interest in India: With a Plan for Establishing a Regular
System of Government in That Country 47 (London, J. Almon 1773) [hereinafter The Present
State of the British Interest in India].
157
Cf. Benton, supra note 37, at 22, 261–62 (discussing the relationship between legal pluralism and political economy); Ross & Stern, supra note 30, at 128–32 (same).
158
See Vaughn, supra note 18, at 26; Welland, supra note 7, at 181.
159
See T.H. Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence, at xviii (2004).
160
Letter from Thomas Gage to Lord Barrington, Sec’y at War (Mar. 10, 1768), Gage Papers, vol. ES 11 (on file with WLCL).
161
Id.
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Lord Mansfield agreed: once colonists began manufacturing, he asked,
“[w]hat then will become of us?”162
These priorities guided Tories’ legal policy.163 Although Quebec was
less economically advanced than its southern neighbors, imperial officials
worried that it had already started to develop manufacturing by the late
1760s.164 Accordingly, Tories looked for ways to redirect its economic
activity towards the extraction of raw materials.165 But while Tories
agreed that manufacturing must be stopped, they worried that its “positive
prohibition” would be “equally impracticable and impolitic.”166 An outright ban would require heavy-handed, resource-intensive tactics that
would alienate colonists without any guarantee of success.167 Accordingly, Tories looked for another “means of diverting the Peoples [sic] attention from” undesirable economic activities.168
The key was to deprive Quebec of the capital and labor that manufacturing required.169 But once again, Tories worried that a direct prohibition
would be ineffective and unpopular.170 Accordingly, Tories manipulated
the legal system to achieve the same end. Politicians knew that British
162

Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, Speech in the House of Lords (Mar. 11, 1766), in 2 Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 335, 342.
163
See [James Marriott], Plan of a Code of Laws for the Province of Quebec 47–48 (London,
n.p. 1774) (stating that economic policy “must direct the spirit of any code of laws” for Quebec).
164
See, e.g., Letter from Lord Hillsborough, Sec’y of State for the Colonies, to Guy Carleton
(Nov. 15, 1768), CO 43/8, at 56 (on file with TNA) [hereinafter Letter from Hillsborough] (“I
am very concerned to find that the Manufacture of Linen & Woollen is carried on to a greater
extent than I conceived the nature of that Country and Climate could have admitted of . . . .”);
see also Letter from Francis Maseres to Fowler Walker (Nov. 19, 1767), in Maseres Letters,
supra note 127, at 55, 61–62.
165
See Lawson, supra note 43, at 113–14; Letter from Guy Carleton to [Lord Hillsborough],
Sec’y of State (Aug. 31, 1768), CO 43/12, at 182, 183 (on file with TNA) (urging London to
“promote the cultivation of Hemp & Flax” in Quebec in order to turn colonists away from
making clothing).
166
Letter from Hillsborough, supra note 164.
167
Id.; cf. 2 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
582 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Liberty Fund 1981) (1789) (describing prohibitions
on colonial manufacturing as “impertinent badges of slavery”).
168
Letter from Hillsborough, supra note 164.
169
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Gage to Lord Barrington (Dec. 2, 1772), Gage Papers, vol.
ES 23, at 3 (on file with WLCL). Tories’ attempt to restrict immigration to North America
was one of the grievances that pushed American Whigs toward independence. See Pincus,
supra note 117, at 117–21.
170
In 1763, British officials had ordered a stop to British settlement west of a line drawn
along the Appalachian Mountains. Settlement continued anyway. See Anderson, supra note
15, at 568–69.
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settlers and investors would be reluctant to entrust themselves or their
capital to a jurisdiction that lacked English law. As early as 1765, British
merchants trading to Quebec had insisted on the need for English law to
protect their interests.171 Any laws “contrary to the Establishment of all
the other Courts of Law in the British Dominions,” they warned, would
have “the most ruinous consequence to every Person in Trade.”172 They
renewed this warning after Parliament passed the Quebec Act. “[I]f we
had supposed the French laws . . . to be still in force there, or to be intended to be revived,” the merchants complained, “we would not have
had any commercial connections with the inhabitants of the said province,
either French or English.”173 But for Tories, that was the point. French
law would scare away investment. It would also scare away people—particularly Protestant immigrants whose connections to Britain might help
jump-start the Canadian economy. As Solicitor General Alexander Wedderburn put it, the Quebec Act reflected Tories’ belief that “it is not the
interest of Britain that many of her natives should settle” in that province.174
Whigs agreed with Tories that legal pluralism would repel immigration
and investment.175 But their political-economic agenda depended on making Quebec rich and populous—and, therefore, on transplanting English

171
The Memorial & Petition from the Merchants & Traders of the City of London Trading
to Canada on Behalf of Themselves & Others (Apr. 18, 1765), CO 42/2, at 102 (on file with
TNA); The Memorial of Fowler Walker, Agent on Behalf of the Merchants, Traders, and Others the Principal Inhabitants of the Cities of Quebec and Montreal (1765), CO 42/2, at 113,
114 (on file with TNA).
172
The Memorial of the Merchants and Other Inhabitants of the City of Quebec (Apr. 10,
1770), CO 42/8, at 7, 7–8 (on file with TNA).
173
The Case of the British Merchants Trading to Quebec (1763), reprinted in Francis Maseres, An Account of the Proceedings of the British, and Other Protestant Inhabitants, of the
Province of Quebeck, in North-America 202, 207–208 (London, B. White 1775) [hereinafter
Case of the British Merchants].
174
Alexander Wedderburn, Report of the Solicitor General (Dec. 6, 1772), in 1 Constitutional History, supra note 129, at 424, 430. Policymakers especially wanted to block settlement
in the Illinois Country, which the Quebec Act also placed under French civil law. See Thomas
Bernard, An Appeal to the Public; Stating and Considering the Objections to the Quebec Bill
54–55 (London, T. Payne & M. Hingeston 1774); William Knox, The Justice and Policy of
the Late Act of Parliament, for Making More Effectual Provision for the Government of the
Province of Quebec 42–43 (London, J. Wilkie 1774) (describing the Quebec Act as having
“the avowed purpose of excluding all further settlement” in the American interior).
175
See, e.g., Letter from Silas Deane to Patrick Henry (Jan. 2, 1775), in Collections of the
New-York Historical Society for the Year 1886, at 33, 35–37 (New York, printed for the Society 1887); Articles of Association, supra note 140, at 76.
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law in order to attract settlers and capital.176 The benefits were not just
economic. If Quebec could attract immigrants from Britain and the older
American colonies, the new arrivals would speed the assimilation of
Canadiens by giving them an example of what it meant to be a British
subject.177 One pamphleteer, eager to accelerate the process, recommended founding a new capital of Quebec—subtly named “British
Town”—to be settled by Englishmen who would introduce “the English
language, the English manners, & a Spirit of Industry, among the French
Canadians.”178 Just as English law had transmuted New Netherland into
New York, it would work the same alchemy in Canada.179
Tories and Whigs also offered different visions for Bengal’s economy.
By the 1770s, the East India Company had ceased to operate as a mere
trading company. Instead, its Tory leadership had turned the Company
into a territorial power whose primary purpose was to tax local inhabitants
and to remit the revenues to London.180 In such a regime, English law was
unnecessary. Legal pluralism was ideal for such a regime because it inhibited resistance to the Company’s expropriation of Indian wealth by
denying colonial subjects the opportunities for redress afforded by English law.181
176

See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Commons Debates (June 10, 1774), in 5 Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 204, 204; supra notes 120–123 (discussing Whigs’ emphasis on colonial population growth and prosperity).
177
See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 43, at 43; Letter to Sir William Meredith, supra note 138,
at 5, 7–8; Maurice Morgann, An Account of the State of Canada from Its Conquest to May
1766 ([1766–67?]), Shelburne Papers, vol. 64, at 525, 548–50 (on file with WLCL).
178
Memorandum to the Board of Trade, Some Thoughts on the Settlement and Government
of Our Colonies in North America (Mar. 10, 1763), Shelburne Papers, vol. 48, folder 44, at
523, 527–29 (on file with WLCL).
179
Case of the British Merchants, supra note 173, at 210.
180
See Bowen, supra note 18, at 111–12; Vaughn, supra note 18, at 533–34; see also Letter
from Philip Francis to Lord North, Prime Minister (Feb. 14, 1777), Mss Eur E15, at 521, 525
(on file with BL) (criticizing the Company on the ground that “every Consideration of prudence is absorbed in the Idea of unlimited Revenue, & immediate Returns”).
181
See supra note 154 (describing the importance of common-law juries for addressing official misconduct at the time); cf. The Present State of the British Interest in India, supra note
156, at 147–49 (London, J. Almon 1773) (arguing that Indians should be allowed to serve on
juries alongside Europeans, and that these mixed juries “would prove the Magna Charta, the
palladium, and true security of Indian liberty and property, against the despotism and extortion
of their foreign government”). As Prasannan Parthasarathi has emphasized, the East India
Company did in fact transplant some English legal ideas into India: those concerning free and
unfree labor. Starting in the late 1760s, the Company introduced new, more coercive ways of
controlling Indian weavers that contravened South Asian assumptions about the legitimacy of
coercing workers. In other words, Company officials readily introduced novel aspects of British discipline—even in the face of local protest—while declining to transplant the more
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Initially, Whigs had hoped that the Company would remain a purely
commercial concern that confined itself to a few coastal outposts.182 But
as it became increasingly clear that the Company intended to become a
territorial power, Whigs shifted their objective, arguing that the Company
should create a settler colony along the lines of Britain’s North American
settlements.183 Transplanting English law was at the core of this alternative vision. The Whig politician William Pulteney told Parliament that
“the establishment of a proper system of laws” in Bengal would inevitably
lead to more Britons residing there.184 In the same speech, Pulteney attacked Tory plans to create a jurisdictional division between native and
European litigants. Only a unified court system based on the laws of England, he suggested, would permit a free settlement based on trade rather
than expropriation.185
Whigs did not assume that Bengal’s climate and population posed an
insurmountable obstacle to building another North America. Under the
right kind of government, argued the writer John Campbell, Britain’s
South Asian outposts could “make as rich and as flourishing Colonies as
Virginia, or Jamaica,” as long as Europeans and Indians were “incorporated” together under a single set of “good laws.”186 Campbell considered
this to be a universal prescription for colonial growth; he offered similar

emancipatory elements of English law. See Prasannan Parthasarathi, The Transition to a Colonial Economy: Weavers, Merchants and Kings in South India, 1720–1800, at 122–24, 147
(2001); see also Om Prakash, From Market-Determined to Coercion-Based: Textile Manufacturing in Eighteenth-Century Bengal, in How India Clothed the World: The World of South
Asian Textiles, 1500–1850, at 217, 224–25, 227–28 (Giorgio Riello & Tirthankar Roy eds.,
2009) (describing the Company’s use of coerced labor in Bengal). Ultimately, the Company’s
introduction of English-style labor discipline without English-style avenues for redress undermined what had been a thriving textile industry. See John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The
Global History of Empire Since 1405, at 193 (2007); Bishnupriya Gupta, Competition and
Control in the Market for Textiles: Indian Weavers and the English East India Company in
the Eighteenth Century, in How India Clothed the World, supra, at 281, 281–83; see also Letter
from Philip Francis to Welbore Ellis, Sec’y at War (Jan. 13, 1777), Mss Eur E15, at 467, 468–
70 (on file with BL) (warning that Company policy was destroying textile manufacturing in
Bengal).
182
See Bowen, supra note 18, at 18–19.
183
See Vaughn, supra note 18, at 386–87 n.181, 545.
184
William Pulteney, Speech to the House of Commons (May 18, 1772), in 17 Parliamentary History, supra note 84, at 471, 472.
185
Id. at 473.
186
[John Campbell], A Collection of Letters Relating to the East India Company, and to a
Free Trade 24–25 (London, W. Owen 1754).
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plans for developing Scotland’s impoverished Western Isles187 and Britain’s new colony in Senegal.188 Whether in Asia, Africa, America, or Britain itself, Whigs offered the same plan for colonial development: economic integration and cultural assimilation, underpinned by a common
law for all British subjects.
B. The Purpose of Transplanting English Law
In most of its new colonies—the Ceded Islands, the Floridas, and Senegal—Britain continued its earlier policy of transplanting English law. As
with earlier efforts to impose English law, transplantation presented challenges and generated local conflicts.189 Nonetheless, Whigs and Tories
agreed that, at least in some cases, the benefits of transplantation justified
the costs.
The West Indian island of Grenada offers perhaps the clearest example
of Britain’s continued willingness to impose English law on new conquests. When Grenada surrendered to British forces in 1762, its articles
of capitulation guaranteed that French law would remain in place until
Britain settled on a long-term legal policy.190 Grenadians did not have
long to wait: Grenada’s first British governor declared French laws void
only a few days after he arrived.191 From the start, officials sought “to
render the civil Constitution of [Grenada], as nearly as possible, similar
to that of” other British colonies and “to check in their Infancy, all irregular and unnecessary deviations from the Laws and Constitution of the
Mother Country.”192 As in other colonies, officials adapted English law
to fit local circumstances.193 Most importantly, members of the island’s
Catholic majority were permitted to serve as jurors, contrary to ordinary
187

1 John Campbell, A Political Survey of Britain 631–33 (London, Printed for the author,
and sold by Richardson [and 9 others] 1774).
188
Brown, supra note 104, at 275 (citing 2 Campbell, supra note 187, at 633). For Senegal
(i.e., Senegambia), see infra notes 208–211 and accompanying text.
189
See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
190
See [James Harris], Hints Relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered
and Newly Acquired Countries in America (June 1, 1763), Shelburne Papers, vol. 48, folder
45, at 543, 552–53 (on file with WLCL); Memorandum of Lord Chief Justice Mansfield [to
Lord Egremont?] (Jan. 13, 1763), PRO 30/47/6 (on file with TNA).
191
Peter Marshall, The Incorporation of Quebec in the British Empire, 1763–1774, in Of
Mother Country and Plantations, supra note 71, at 42, 48.
192
A Sketch of a Report with Observations on the Commission and Instructions for the
Governor of Granada ([1764?]), Shelburne Papers, vol. 49, folder 20, at 293, 294–95 (on file
with WLCL).
193
Imperial officials modeled many local regulations on those of Barbados. Id. at 302.
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English law.194 Although that decision provoked a backlash from some of
the island’s Protestants, officials in London insisted that this limited concession was the surest path to an anglicized legal system.195 French Grenadians, for their part, seemed pleased with the arrangement.196
Britain’s decision to introduce English law to Grenada reflected a political consensus that developing the sugar-rich West Indies would benefit
the empire economically.197 Politicians did not always agree on the details
of how those islands should be developed. The prudence and morality of
slavery, in particular, divided many politicians (not always along party
lines).198 But politicians nonetheless united in thinking that the West Indies would benefit from an influx of English settlers, which would require
the attraction of English law.199 For instance, although the Tory John
Shebbeare favored legal pluralism in Quebec, he urged Britain to anglicize West Indian law, because “[o]ur laws and rules of government”
would allow planters to be more productive than France’s “cramping regulations.”200 Tories like Shebbeare were willing to develop the West Indies, unlike Quebec, in part because they believed that planters’ fear of
slave revolts and external attack would guarantee their loyalty to London.201

194

Muller, supra note 43, at 127.
See Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The American Revolution
and the British Caribbean 124–25 (2000); Alexander Wood Renton, French Law Within the
British Empire, 10 J. Soc’y Comp. Legis. 93, 93 (1909).
196
See Anderson, supra note 15, at 490.
197
See, e.g., Objects To Be Attended to in Granting Lands in the Newly Acquired Islands
([after 1763]), Shelburne Papers, vol. 74, at 63, 63 (on file with WLCL); Some Hints for the
Better Settlement of the Ceded Islands ([1763]), Shelburne Papers, vol. 48, folder 46, at 567,
569 (on file with WLCL) [hereinafter Hints].
198
See Brown, supra note 104, at 33–35, 155–57; Pincus, supra note 117, at 121–27; Sebastiani, supra note 105, at 41–42.
199
Muller, supra note 43, at 37; Hints, supra note 197, at 567–69; see also Robert Melvill,
Some General Heads Submitted Concerning the Most Eligible Plan of Government for the
New Acquired Islands . . . , Shelburne Papers, vol. 74, at 51, 51–52, 55 (on file with WLCL)
(listing benefits of establishing a general government).
200
[John Shebbeare], One More Letter to the People of England 16–17 (London, J. Pridden
1762). For Shebbeare’s support of the Quebec Act, see John Shebbeare, An Answer to the
Queries, Contained in a Letter to Dr. Shebbeare 30–31 (London, S. Hooper & T. Davies [1775]).
201
See O’Shaughnessy, supra note 195, at 36, 49–50 (arguing that the British West Indies
remained loyal to Britain during the American Revolution in part because of white planters’
reliance on the imperial army to protect against slave revolts).
195

COPYRIGHT © 2019 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2019]

Why Didn’t the Common Law Follow the Flag?

517

Security concerns also shaped legal policy in the Floridas.202 Whigs
and Tories agreed on the need to encourage anglophone immigration to
those colonies to build them up as buffers against Spanish or French aggression.203 Moreover, unlike in Quebec, there was little danger that the
Floridas would develop manufacturing. To the contrary, those colonies
needed additional settlers even to be able to export food and raw materials
to Britain and its Caribbean colonies.204 Accordingly, Whigs and Tories
agreed on the need to transplant English law in order to attract immigrants.205 The Tory administrator William Knox, for instance, argued that
British subjects would be more likely to settle in Florida if they could
“know that they are immediately to have the Benefit of the Laws of Great
Britain.”206 George Johnstone, the Whig governor of West Florida,
agreed. “Establishing the Civil Government of this Province agreeably to
the laws of Great Britain & the precepts of her Constitution is one of the
principal objects which his Majesty & his Ministers had in view in sending me here,” he told a local military commander.207
Britain’s willingness to transplant English law was not limited to the
Americas. Whigs and Tories also agreed that Britain should impose English law on the former French colony of Senegal, now made part of British
Senegambia. Imperial officials hoped that English law would shape Senegambia into an American-style settler colony.208 Although its climate

202
In East Florida, the decision to transplant English law was facilitated by the departure of
its Spanish population. In West Florida, however, many French settlers remained. See Calloway, supra note 16, at 152–56.
203
See id. at 155–57; Clarence Edwin Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country, 1763–
1774, at 135 (1910).
204
See Robin F.A. Fabel, The Economy of British West Florida, 1763–1783, at 6–7, 138–
40 (1988).
205
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 190, at 552–53 (arguing that because the Floridas would
likely “be settled either by foreign Protestants, or the King’s natural born subjects,” the colonial constitution should be modeled on that of “Georgia, or Nova Scotia . . . without any material alteration”); cf. supra note 61 and accompanying text (noting seventeenth-century efforts
to use English law to attract settlers).
206
[William Knox], Hints Respecting the Settlement of Florida 8, 9 ([1763]), William Knox
Papers, box 9, folder 3 (on file with WLCL). His proposal also argued for freedom of religion,
which would attract non-Protestant settlers. Id. at 8–9.
207
Letter from George Johnstone, Governor of W. Fla., to Major Robert Farmar (Jan. 7,
1765), Gage Papers, vol. AS 30 (on file with WLCL).
208
See Smith, supra note 62, at 268–69; Matthew P. Dziennik, ‘Till These Experiments Be
Made’: Senegambia and British Imperial Policy in the Eighteenth Century, 130 Eng. Hist.
Rev. 1132, 1146–47 (2015).

COPYRIGHT © 2019 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

518

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 105:483

seemed unfavorable for European settlement,209 Senegambia’s British
governor believed that it could attract both British and African settlers.
The latter, argued the governor, would support British rule as long as the
government “secur[ed] their property” under a transparent rule of law.210
The proposal for a West African settler colony received support not only
from the typically pro-development Whigs but also from prominent Tories, including Treasury official Thomas Whately and the political economist Malachy Postlethwayt, who had previously supported the slave
trade but now sought to incorporate Africans into European commercial
networks.211
In short, Britain transplanted English law to the Ceded Islands, Senegambia, and the Floridas because politicians agreed that those provinces
should be developed as settler colonies on the American model. Those
colonies differed widely from each other and from other British colonies
with respect to their geography, their resource endowments, and the nature of non-British populations. The one thing they had in common was a
consensus among British policymakers in favor of introducing English
law.
IV. RETHINKING TOLERATION
Although Whigs and Tories agreed about extending English law to
some colonies, they laid out starkly different proposals for Bengal and
Quebec. Why did Tories win? In part, their success reflected broader political trends: for most of the 1760s and 1770s, Tories were the party in
power. But even so, they remained a minority party,212 and achieving their
209
See Acemoglu et al., supra note 38, at 1398; Entry of April 1767, in Calendar of Home
Office Papers of the Reign of George III: 1766–1769, at 167–70 (Joseph Redington ed., London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1879), http://www.british-history.ac.uk/home-officegeo3/1766-9/pp165-170.
210
Dziennik, supra note 208, at 1146 (citing Letter from Charles O’Hara, Governor of Senegambia, to H.S. Conway, Sec’y of State (May 28, 1766), Shelburne Papers, vol. 81, ff. 103–
18 (on file with WLCL)).
211
See Brown, supra note 104, at 272–73. The colony of Senegambia ultimately failed,
partly due to remarkably bad leadership. See Dziennik, supra note 208, at 1149–50 (“Of the
nine officials to hold senior office in Senegambia . . . , three were dismissed, one died in office, one had a mental breakdown, one was later executed for murder, and one . . . was overthrown in a violent coup . . . .”). France reconquered the colony in 1779. Id. at 1150.
212
In the late 1760s, Tory-aligned MPs probably made up a third of the House of Commons.
See Duke of Newcastle, Parliamentary Lists (Mar. 2, 1767), Add MS 33001 (on file with BL);
Lord Rockingham, [Analysis of Personnel of House of Commons] (Dec. 20, 1766),
WWM/R/86 (on file with SA). Another group—denigrated as “Swiss” by Rockingham, after
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goals required them either to recruit independents to their cause or to divide potential opponents.213 One way Tories managed to do this in the
case of legal pluralism was to frame it as a moral issue. Some Tories described the preservation of local laws as a humanitarian duty that conquerors owed to the conquered. Others used the language of rights. But
although the details varied, Tories successfully reshaped contemporary
notions of religious and cultural toleration, so even many Whigs came to
believe that Britain had an obligation to preserve the laws of non-British
subjects.
Tories’ moral arguments led Whigs to clarify what kind of legal pluralism they found most troubling. Instead of attacking legal pluralism in
general, Whigs began to focus on a few areas where legal uniformity
seemed most critical, such as civil procedure and commercial law. In doing so, Whigs proposed a new framework for sustaining a diverse but
united empire. Although that compromise failed to gain traction in the
short term, it had an enduring influence on later American and British
thinking about the role of law in empire-building.214
A. Legal Pluralism, Natural Rights, and Humanitarianism
Most Tories supported colonial legal pluralism because of its politicaleconomic consequences.215 But for some, such as Lord Chief Justice
Mansfield, preserving local laws was also a duty. When Mansfield
learned that Britain had introduced English law to Quebec in 1764, he
attacked the decision as both “rash and unjust.”216 Quebec’s Governor
Carleton agreed. Imposing English law on Canada, he wrote, was “[a]
Sort of Severity, if I remember right, never before practiced by any Conqueror.”217

the famous mercenaries—could be counted on to back any government-supported measures.
Since the Tories were in power during the late 1760s and 1770s, they could generally count
on “Swiss” support. But even so, that gave Tories a bare majority at best.
213
Cf. Ian R. Christie, Wars and Revolutions: Britain 1760–1815, at 30–33 (1982) (estimating that the majority of MPs lacked a party affiliation).
214
See Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, Zionist Settlers and the English Private Trust in Mandate Palestine, 30 Law & Hist. Rev. 813, 814–15 (2012).
215
See supra Section III.A.
216
Letter from Lord Chief Justice Mansfield to George Grenville (Dec. 24, 1764), in 2 The
Grenville Papers 476, 476–77 (William James Smith ed., 1852).
217
Letter from Guy Carleton to Lord Shelburne, supra note 142, at 289.
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Tories’ deontological defenses of legal pluralism came in two varieties:
humanitarian appeals to empathy and invocations of natural rights.218
Both of these approaches appeared in an exchange between Mansfield and
Warren Hastings, the first governor-general of Bengal. Hastings was one
of the original architects of legal pluralism in Bengal, and he worried that
Parliament might try to overturn his work.219 Hastings and his colleagues
had previously defended legal pluralism in consequentialist terms,220 but
as he lobbied London to defend legal pluralism, he began to adopt the
language of rights. In a letter asking for Mansfield’s help, Hastings described the Company’s policy as securing “the rights of a great nation in
the most essential point of civil liberty, the preservation of its own
laws.”221 In the same letter, Hastings twice more used the language of
rights, insisting on Indians’ “right to possess . . . the protection of their
own laws,”222 which he described as “the most sacred and valuable of
[their] rights.”223 Two years later, in another letter to Mansfield, Hastings
again invoked “the rights of the people” to their own laws.224 Over time,
this rights-talk worked its way into the Company’s official vocabulary.225
218

Robert Travers has identified a third kind of principled argument for legal pluralism in
Bengal: ancient constitutionalism. See Travers, supra note 7, at 7–9. As Travers shows, British
officials translated the longstanding concept of an ancient English constitution into the claim
that India enjoyed an ancient constitution of its own, which Britain had a duty to preserve or
restore. But ancient constitutionalism operated primarily in the context of debates about what
kind of legal pluralism Britain should administer, not debates about whether pluralism was
appropriate at all.
219
See Letter from Warren Hastings to Robert Palk (Nov. 11, 1772), Add MS 29127, at 49r,
49v (on file with BL).
220
See infra note 243. In 1773, for instance, when the Company censured an employee for
suing an Indian landowner under English law, it argued not that the landowner’s rights had
been violated, but that such suits might reduce tax revenues. See Board’s Minute (May 21,
1773), IOR/P/2/3, at 275v–276 (on file with BL).
221
Letter from Warren Hastings to Lord Chief Justice Mansfield (Mar. 21, 1774), in 1 G.R.
Gleig, Memoirs of the Life of the Right Hon. Warren Hastings, First Governor-General of
Bengal 399, 399 (London, R. Bentley 1841).
222
Id. at 400.
223
Id. at 403.
224
Letter from Warren Hastings to Lord Chief Justice Mansfield (Jan. 20, 1776), in 2 Gleig,
supra note 221, at 20, 21.
225
See, e.g., Letter from Governor-General & Council to EIC Ct. of Dirs. (Feb. 29, 1780),
Mss Eur E36, at 637, 655 (on file with BL) (describing efforts to introduce English law as a
campaign “to deprive the Natives of those Rights, which they have hitherto enjoyed under
every change of Government”); John Day, EIC Advocate Gen., Memorandum (Dec. 27,
1782), IOR/H/423, at 389, 391 (on file with BL) (warning that it would violate Indians’ “natural rights” to subject them to English law); Francis Russell, Solicitor to the Bd. of Control,
Heads of Defects in Matters of Law and Judicature in India (Mar. 20, 1794), IOR/H/414, at
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Describing legal pluralism as a right had obvious tactical advantages.226
But Mansfield declined to adopt Hastings’s language. Mansfield did not
explain why; but he may have been concerned that rights-talk ran contrary
to a long line of judicial precedents (including one opinion by Mansfield
himself) that had affirmed Britain’s right to abrogate the laws of conquered peoples.227 Mansfield may also have been reluctant to promote a
new kind of rights claim that colonial subjects might later turn against
their rulers. Whatever the reason, Mansfield replied to Hastings with a
different defense of legal pluralism: humanitarian empathy. “[N]o measure could be more barbarous, in every sense of the Epithet,” Mansfield
wrote, “than to change the Laws of any People, except by very slow degrees, & in consequence of long Experience.”228 Mansfield assumed that
“Positive Laws & Usages are, in themselves, indifferent,” since people
“at all times and in all places” agree about the basic principles of “Right
& Wrong.”229 Nonetheless, people prefer the laws they know, and legal
change was therefore painful.230 Reforms might sometimes be necessary,
but only a “barbarous” conqueror would fail to recognize their emotional
cost.
This kind of humanitarian argument became a staple of Tory rhetoric.231 Solicitor General Alexander Wedderburn, for instance, argued that
81, 91–93 (on file with BL). Lawyers soon clarified what kind of right was at stake: because
Indian laws were religious laws, legal pluralism was fundamentally about protecting the conscience of Indians. See A[rchibald?] Macdonald, Observations on the Subject of English Judicature in India (Dec. 31, 1782), IOR/H/411, at 91, 91–92 (on file with BL); see also Bernard
S. Cohn, Law and the Colonial State in India, in History and Power in the Study of Law 131,
140–47 (June Starr & Jane F. Collier eds., 1989) (describing legal pluralism as rooted in the
theory that India was a theocratic society); Jakob De Roover & S.N. Balagangadhara, Liberty,
Tyranny and the Will of God: The Principle of Toleration in Early Modern Europe and Colonial India, 30 Hist. Pol. Thought 111, 136–37 (2009) (describing the development of religious
toleration in British India).
226
Rights were not necessarily trumps in the eighteenth century, but rights of conscience
were presumptively immune from governmental interference. See Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 Const. Comment. 85, 92 & n.34 (2017) (reviewing
Randy E. Barnett, Our Republican Constitution: Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We
the People (2016)).
227
See Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047–49; 1 Cowp. 204, 209–12 (KB).
228
Letter from Lord Chief Justice Mansfield to Warren Hastings ([1775]), Add MS 39781,
at 2r, 2r (on file with BL).
229
Id. For Mansfield’s use of natural law, see Lieberman, supra note 93, at 95–97; James
Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield 88–90 (2004).
230
Letter from Mansfield to Hastings, supra note 228, at 2r.
231
For Bengal, see, for example, Verelst, supra note 147, at 145 (asserting that “humanity,
justice, and sound policy will equally demand” legal pluralism in Bengal).
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although Britain had the right to impose English law on Quebec, “it would
be more humane” to leave Canadiens their own laws.232 The Quebec Act,
he told Parliament, would be “a recompense for the evils of war,” ameliorating the trauma of conquest by limiting its effects.233 Attorney General Edward Thurlow defended the Quebec Act in similar terms, telling
the Commons that “humanity, justice, and wisdom equally conspire to
advise you to leave [the laws] to the people just as they were.”234
These arguments represented an important expansion of Britain’s humanitarian tradition. During the first half of the eighteenth century, British diplomats and politicians had developed a policy of intervening on
behalf of religious minorities in other countries.235 Although Britain’s humanitarian interventions initially focused on the plight of Protestants, by
1750 Britain were also pressuring foreign governments to stop targeting
Jews and Catholics. In doing so, British officials appealed both to natural
law and to empathy for the oppressed.236 In one sense, then, Tories’ appeal
to natural rights and humanitarian empathy simply extended an earlier
tradition of concern for minorities. In another respect, however, Tory arguments marked a crucial innovation.
Earlier humanitarian appeals had focused on “the victims of bodily
depredation,” with the paradigmatic cases being the “imprisonment, torture, or exile” of religious minorities.237 Because earlier iterations of humanitarianism had focused on physical violence, early eighteenth-century
politicians had found it perfectly acceptable to insist on legal uniformity

232
Alexander Wedderburn, Speech in House of Commons (June 13, 1774), in 5 Proceedings
and Debates, supra note 126, at 226, 226.
233
Alexander Wedderburn, Speech in House of Commons (May 26, 1774), in 4 Proceedings
and Debates, supra note 126, at 465, 466.
234
Edward Thurlow, Speech in House of Commons (May 26, 1774), in 4 Proceedings and
Debates, supra note 126, at 453, 455–56.
235
Catherine Arnold, Affairs of Humanity: Sovereignty, Sentiment, and the Origins of Humanitarian Intervention in Britan and Europe (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University) (on file with author).
236
Id. at 5–6, 29–30.
237
Catherine Arnold, Civility, Toleration, and “Human Rights as Empathy,” Immanent
Frame (Jan. 27, 2017), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2017/01/27/civility-toleration-and-human-rights-as-empathy [https://perma.cc/V632-P8A8]; see also Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights:
A History 70–112 (2007) (describing early humanitarian arguments as focused on judicially
sanctioned torture); Samuel Moyn, Theses on Humanitarianism and Human Rights, Humanity
J. (Sept. 23, 2016), http://humanityjournal.org/blog/theses-on-humanitarianism-and-humanrights [https://perma.cc/E3KP-YLFX] (noting that humanitarianism typically focuses on
“bodily violation”).
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at home, even as they objected to religious oppression abroad.238 The
same Whig ministry that intervened on behalf of persecuted Jews in Bohemia in the 1740s239 aggressively worked to anglicize Scots law around
the same time.240 Tories in the 1770s rejected that limited understanding
of humanitarianism by equating the imposition of English law with physical violence. Thomas Bernard, for example, argued that introducing English law to Quebec would be akin to proselytizing heretics “by fire and
faggot.”241 Bernard’s readers might have found it odd to conflate the introduction of civil juries with an auto-da-fé, but he urged them to overcome their skepticism through greater empathy: “Let us then put ourselves, for a moment, in the situation of our conquered Canadian
subjects.”242
For many Tories, these invocations of humanitarianism may well have
been sincere. But several considerations suggest that they served primarily to justify a policy Tories had first embraced for instrumental reasons.
First, Tories were less inclined to make deontological arguments for legal
pluralism when they failed to advance Tories’ political-economic agenda.
For example, Mansfield reacted with shock to forcibly anglicizing the
laws of Quebec—but not, for example, those of Grenada. Second, some
Tories—particularly Warren Hastings—did not begin to articulate a deontological defense of legal pluralism until after they had already adopted
that policy for expressly instrumental reasons.243
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Tory humanitarianism was
more aggressive about protecting Canadian and Indian laws than Canadians and Indians themselves may have preferred. As Lauren Benton and
other historians of colonial law have emphasized, colonial subjects in
238

Cf. Arnold, supra note 235, at 401–02 (discussing Britain’s policy of coercing Irish Catholics).
239
Id. at 349–50.
240
See supra Section II.B.
241
Bernard, supra note 174, at 36.
242
Id. at 35.
243
Hastings initially emphasized that the East India Company’s preservation of Hindu and
Islamic law did not “preclude the right . . . to establish new regulations upon any occasion
where they may be required.” [Warren Hastings], Regulations Proposed for the Government
of Bengal ([1772]), in M.E. Monckton Jones, Warren Hastings in Bengal, 1772–1774, at 153,
157 (1918); see also Letter from President & Council, Ft. William (Calcutta) to EIC Court of
Dirs. (Jan. 6, 1773), IOR/E/4/31, at 227, 230 (on file with BL) (stating that the EIC could
change local laws if “any Inconvenience should be found to arise from” them). He first articulated a rights-based defense of legal pluralism two years later. See supra notes 221–224 and
accompanying text.
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many empires have proved adept at adapting to and exploiting new legal
systems.244 Quebec and Bengal were no exception, and non-British litigants frequently resorted to English courts whenever they could gain entry to them.245 Indeed, some Indians and French Canadians actively petitioned for greater access to English law, partly due to their keen
understanding of legal pluralism’s political-economic consequences.246
This is not to say that English law was universally beloved. Local elites
often preferred the old laws that protected their social and political
preeminence, and some kinds of law were closely linked to questions of
religious and cultural identity. But as the next Section explains, the Tory
program of legal pluralism exceeded what many of Britain’s newest subjects wanted.
B. What Kind of Legal Pluralism Mattered?
Some kinds of legal pluralism mattered more than others. The disagreement between Whigs and Tories concentrated on the kinds of law that
each side perceived as most crucial to economic and political development. This distinction emerged with respect to both Bengal and Quebec,
but its specifics differed for each colony. For the sake of brevity and clarity, this Section focuses on the Canadian case.247
244

Lauren Benton, Historical Perspectives on Legal Pluralism, in Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue 21, 25 (Brian Z. Tamanaha, Caroline Sage
& Michael Woolcock eds., 2012); see also Marc Galanter, The Aborted Restoration of “Indigenous” Law in India, 14 Comp. Stud. Soc’y & Hist. 53, 65 (1972) (describing the operation
of English law in independent India).
245
See Mitch Fraas, supra note 68; Donald Fyson, The Conquered and the Conqueror: The
Mutual Adaptation of the Canadiens and the British in Quebec, 1759–1775, in Revisiting
1759, supra note 7, at 190, 205.
246
See, e.g., Daniel Blouin & William Clajon, Recueil de Pièces traduites de l’Anglais . . .
(July 8, 1771), Gage Papers, vol. AS 138, folder 17 (on file with WLCL); Proposals of Inhabitants of Detroit, About Erecting Courts of Justice There ([1766 or 1767]), Gage Papers, vol.
AS 60 (on file with WLCL); supra note 70 (describing an Indian complaint that the law applied
in an East India Company court was insufficiently English). In the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, Indian litigants and lawyers often demanded increased access to English law, especially English courts and procedures. See Abhinav Chandrachud, An Independent, Colonial
Judiciary: A History of the Bombay High Court During the British Raj, 1862–1947, at 23–25
(2015); Mitra Sharafi, Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia: Parsi Legal Culture, 1772–
1947, at 202–04 (2014).
247
Discussions concerning Bengal also distinguished among different kinds of law. As in
Quebec, local inhabitants seemed less concerned to protect their traditional laws in “matters
of Debts, Commercial Disputes, and the Various Petty Contests & differences which Daily
occur amongst Men of Business.” Letter from Samuel Middleton & George Hurst to President
& Council of Ft. William (Apr. 6, 1772), IOR/P/1/51, at 336v, 337v (on file with BL); see
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Debates about legal pluralism in Quebec came to focus on civil procedure, commercial law, and torts.248 On one hand, Tories showed little inclination to preserve French criminal law, which would have done little
to advance their political-economic agenda,249 and which struck even
many Tories as insufficiently protective of individual freedom.250 On the
other hand, many Whigs were willing to preserve French laws of inheritance, real property, and domestic relations, as long as Quebec received
other aspects of English law.251
Jain, supra note 109, at 455; infra note 257 (discussing family law). But in Bengal, the East
India Company had inherited a preexisting regime of legal pluralism, in which the Mughal
Empire had imposed Islamic public law while allowing Hindus to resolve their own intrareligious disputes. See J. Duncan M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India 229 (1968). As
a result, Company officials had to decide not only whether to implement legal pluralism but
also where to draw the line between Hindu and Islamic jurisdictional claims in light of preexisting arrangements. See, e.g., Nandini Chatterjee, Hindu City and Just Empire: Banaras and
India in Ali Ibrahim Khan’s Legal Imagination, 15 J. Colonialism & Colonial Hist. (2014),
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/542521; Letter from Naib Dewan ([Apr.] 1772), IOR/P/1/51, at
339 (on file with BL).
248
These modern terms map roughly onto eighteenth-century understandings. Amalia Kessler has recently shown that “the category of procedure” crystalized only in the mid-nineteenth
century. See Amalia D. Kessler, Inventing American Exceptionalism: The Origins of American Adversarial Legal Culture, 1800–1877, at 11 (2017). Nonetheless, eighteenth-century lawyers and merchants frequently referred to the “mode . . . for deciding of trying questions” or
the “method of determining disputes,” phrases that encompassed not only trials by jury but
also other aspects of what lawyers today would think of as civil procedure. See infra notes
255, 267; see also, e.g., John Dunning, Speech in the House of Commons (June 10, 1774), in
5 Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 221, 221. This Article uses “commercial law”
as shorthand for the constellation of laws governing commercial exchange, especially laws
related to contract and debt. Finally, this Article uses “tort” to describe “actions for the reparation of injuries received, such as actions of false imprisonment, and of slander, and of assault.” See infra note 255. Such actions were important mostly for addressing official misconduct. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
249
Cf. John H. Langbein, Albion’s Fatal Flaws, Past & Present, Feb. 1983, at 96, 119 (“From
the standpoint of the rulers, . . . the criminal justice system occupies a place not much more
central than the garbage collection system.”).
250
Tories asserted that Canadiens were eager to receive English criminal law because it was
“a more refined, a more merciful law, than the law of France.” Lord North, Speech in the
House of Commons (May 26, 1774), in 4 Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 445,
447. Compare Alexander Wedderburn, Report 11 ([1772]), R2903-0-4-E, Edmund Burke
Fonds (on file with Nat’l Archives of Can.) (describing French criminal law as “incompatible
with an English Government of any sort”), with Alexander Wedderburn, Commons Debate
(May 26, 1774), in 4 Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 465, 468 (“I would not have
compelled the Canadians to adopt the criminal law [of England], if they had found it as an
hardship.”). I thank Michel Morin and Aaron Willis for directing me to the copy of Wedderburn’s report in the National Archives of Canada.
251
Radical Whigs initially objected to French land tenures. See, e.g., John Adams, Notes of
Debates in the Continental Congress, (Oct. 17[?], 1774), in 2 Diary and Autobiography of
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Whigs’ distinction between acceptable and unacceptable legal pluralism originated with a group of moderate, “establishment” Whigs, who
suggested that Britain should anglicize only those laws that were necessary to secure Canadians’ political and economic integration into the British Empire. According to these establishment Whigs, the laws of real
property, inheritance, and domestic relations were less central to that task.
This distinction was first advanced by a series of prominent Whig lawyers, including Britain’s attorney and solicitor general,252 Quebec’s chief
justice,253 and Quebec’s attorney general.254 These lawyers soon convinced their allies that a limited extension of English law—one focused
on the commercial law, torts, and civil procedure—would be enough to
block Tories’ political-economic agenda.255
Establishment Whigs did not explain how they determined which areas
of law mattered, but their distinction seems to have derived from two related concerns. First, British officials believed that although Canadiens
were especially attached to their customs concerning “Descent of estates
& conveyance of landed property,”256 they were more inclined to adopt
English procedure and commercial law.257 As a result, establishment
John Adams, supra note 154, at 154, 154 (objecting to the preservation of “feudal Law” in
Quebec); see also Case of the British Merchants, supra note 173, at 209 (arguing that the
“policy of the crown of Great-Britain” had always been to impose English law without “the
least mixture of the” preconquest legal system).
252
Charles Yorke & William De Grey, Report of Attorney and Solicitor General Regarding
the Civil Government of Quebec (Apr. 14, 1766), in 2 Constitutional History, supra note 129,
at 174–78.
253
See Neatby, supra note 153, at 106.
254
Letter from Francis Maseres to Sir John Eardley Wilmot (Aug. 16, 1773), OSB MSS
File, folder 9999 (on file with BRBML); Maseres to Sutton, supra note 127, at 108.
255
For instance, a group of British merchants trading to Quebec wrote that they were “most
especially anxious” to have Parliament introduce English law related
to matters of navigation, commerce, and personal contracts, and the method of determining disputes upon those subjects by the trial by jury, and likewise . . . to actions for
the reparation of injuries received, such as actions of false imprisonment, and of slander, and of assault, and whatever relates to the liberty of the person.
Case of the British Merchants, supra note 173, at 211; see also To the Printer, Pub. Advertiser
(London), May 19, 1774, at 6 (“[A]re the Trials to be by Juries? . . . [H]ow are Debts to be
proved by People residing in Great Britain against People in Quebec? What is to be the Interest
of Money in that Country, and what Damages on Bills of Exchange?”). In contrast, the merchants had no objection to retaining French law regarding “tenures and descents of land.” Case
of the British Merchants, supra note 173, at 209.
256
[William Dowdeswell], Observations on Mr Maseres[’s] letters to Mr T. Townshend
(Nov. 11, 1766), William Dowdeswell Papers, folder 10 (on file with WLCL).
257
See, e.g., Letter from Philip Yorke, 2d Earl of Hardwicke to Lord Rockingham, Prime
Minister (June 30, 1766), WWM/R/1/638 (on file with SA) (suggesting “that the Canadians
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Whigs hoped that their compromise might win the affection of Britain’s
new subjects while gradually introducing them to English legal culture.258
At the same time, Whigs hoped that by allowing Canadiens to keep the
laws they loved most, they could satisfy politicians who were inclined
toward legal pluralism on humanitarian grounds.259
Second, Whigs perceived laws governing land tenures, inheritance, and
domestic relations as less important than other areas of law for shaping
Quebec’s political and economic development.260 In contrast, tort, commercial law, and civil procedure would play a vital role in its economic
liked our free & impartial Forms of Judicature, & only desired to be left to their old Laws &
Customs for private Property”); Maseres to Sutton, supra note 127, at 108; see also Michel
Morin, Blackstone and the Birth of Quebec’s Distinct Legal Culture 1765–1867, in Re-Interpreting Blackstone’s Commentaries: A Seminal Text in National and International Contexts
105, 112 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2014) (suggesting that Canadiens were relatively willing to accept
English commercial law); Testimony of Guy Carleton (June 2, 1774), in 5 Proceedings and
Debates, supra note 126, at 3, 3 (same); Testimony of the Marquis de Lotbinière (June 3,
1774), in 5 Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 61, 61 (same). Similarly, some proponents of English law in Bengal conceded that it would be unwise or unjust to interfere with
laws concerning domestic relations or religion. See, e.g., 3 Alexander Dow, The History of
Hindostan from the Death of Akbar, to the Complete Settlement of the Empire Under Aurungzebe, at cxlii–cxliii (London, T. Becket & P. A. de Hondt 2d ed. 1772) (arguing that it was
“absolutely necessary for the peace and prosperity of the country, that the laws of England . . . should prevail” in general, but that certain “regulations, with regard to [Indians’]
women and religion, must never be touched”).
258
See Edmund Burke, Notes for Speech on the Canada Bill (1774), WWM/Bk P/6/5 (on
file with SA).
259
See John Glynn, Speech in the House of Commons (June 10, 1774), in 5 Proceedings
and Debates, supra note 126, at 185, 185; Isaac Barré, Speech in the House of Commons (June
2, 1774), in 5 Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 17, 17; Dunning, supra note 248,
at 221. It is unclear whether this attachment to property and family law reflected purely cultural factors or a sense that the intrinsic nature of some kinds of law would make them particularly hard to change. Cf. Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of
Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 20–21 (2012) (explaining
why property law is often more resistant to change than procedural law).
260
The Quebec Act authorized the use of either French- or English-style wills, which suggests that Tories agreed that the introduction of English inheritance law would be relatively
insignificant for the colony’s political economy. See Quebec Act 1774, 14 Geo. 3 c. 83, § 10.
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations—published two years after the Quebec Act’s passage—
helps to explain why Whigs and Tories might have been flexible about inheritance rules. Smith
thought that because French inheritance law distributed land more equally than the English
rule of primogeniture, French law might have helped early colonial development by keeping
land prices low. See 2 Smith, supra note 167, at 572. This was the same strategy pursued by
many British North American colonies when they rejected primogeniture. See id. In other
words, in North America, French and English law tended to converge toward a model that
discouraged the formation of large estates. Moreover, Smith thought that in most colonies,
inheritance was probably a less important mechanism for land transfer than alienation. See id.
at 572–73.
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and political life.261 Tort law mattered primarily because suits against
governmental agents were a crucial means of redressing official misconduct.262 Commercial law was self-evidently important to merchants.263
And civil procedure mattered principally because it protected civil juries.264 Together, these three areas of law would do most of the work of
determining what kind of colony Quebec would become. As a result,
when it came to those core subjects, Whigs insisted that Britain transplant
English law even if Canadiens objected.265 This was especially true of
civil procedure.266 For instance, Fowler Walker, a Whig barrister and the
lobbyist for Quebec’s anglophone merchants, acknowledged that some
Canadiens might object to the “tediousness” of English modes of proceeding. He nonetheless suggested “that they should consider those delays as the price which they pay for & the Criterion of their liberty.”267
He attributed the sentiment to Montesquieu—offering yet another instance in which The Spirit of the Laws could be invoked to defend a program of legal uniformity.268
V. IMPLICATIONS
Britain’s decision to encourage legal pluralism in Bengal and Quebec
inaugurated a new era of empire. For the first time, Britain’s projection of
261

Whigs viewed land tenures as less important for development than procedure or commercial law—but not unimportant. Adam Smith, for instance, argued that English land tenures
had been crucial to the early success of British North America. See 2 Smith, supra note 167,
at 573. In addition, merchants were very concerned about whether the Debt Recovery Act,
1732, 5 Geo. 2 c. 7, extended to Quebec. That statute, which made real property equivalent to
chattel property for the purpose of satisfying colonial debts, was seen as having an important
effect on credit. See Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its
Limits in American History, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 427–28 (2006); To the Printer, supra note
255, at 6.
262
See supra notes 154–155 and accompanying text.
263
See supra note 255.
264
For the importance of juries, see supra notes 152–156.
265
See Edouard Fabre-Surveyer, The Struggle for English Commercial Law in Canada, 34
Com. L. League J. 616, 623 (1929).
266
Nonetheless, many Whigs were willing to tweak English procedure to accommodate
French sensibilities, such as by compensating jurors or removing the requirement that juries
decide cases unanimously. See Testimony of William Hey, Chief Justice of Quebec, in the
House of Commons (June 2, 1774), in 5 Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 35; cf.
supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing how English courts in the 1740s had modified oath-taking to accommodate Hindu litigants).
267
Fowler Walker, Considerations on the Present State of the Province of Quebec (Mar. 1,
1766), Add MS 35915, at 45 (on file with BL).
268
Id.
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power depended not on the extension of English law but on its restriction.
Colonial legal policies remained contested for as long as the British Empire endured, and policymakers and colonial subjects continued to question the prudence and justice of legal pluralism.269 Nonetheless, Tories
had established an enduring framework. After the eighteenth century, the
question became not whether Britain’s conquered colonies would be juridically distinct, but how.270
This historical argument offers two broader lessons about the role of
legal institutions in shaping development outcomes. The first concerns
efforts to evaluate the quality of legal institutions today. The second lesson relates to legal pluralism’s normative value.
A. Evaluating Legal Institutions
Most scholars agree that a country’s well-being depends at least partly
on its institutions.271 But efforts to identify which institutions promote development have proved more controversial.272 In particular, scholars continue to debate whether some legal systems lead to better political and
economic outcomes than others.273
269

See infra notes 317–320 and accompanying text.
See C.A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830, at
159–60 (1989).
271
See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of
Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (2012); Justin duRivage & Claire Priest, The Stamp Act and
the Political Origins of American Legal and Economic Institutions, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 875,
878–80 (2015); Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J.
Econ. Hist. 803 (1989); Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and
the Relative Decline of Pre-Industrial China, 13 San Diego Int’l L.J. 129, 199 (2011). Although discussion continues about institutions’ importance relative to other factors, few scholars would disagree that institutions matter. See, e.g., Prasannan Parthasarathi, Why Europe
Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850, at 84–85 (2011);
Jared Diamond, What Makes Countries Rich or Poor?, N.Y. Rev. Books (June 7, 2012),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2012/06/07/what-makes-countries-rich-or-poor
[https://perma.cc/VJ92-75B7] (reviewing Acemoglu & Robinson, supra); Jeffrey D. Sachs,
Government, Geography, and Growth: The True Drivers of Economic Development, 91 Foreign Aff., Sept.–Oct. 2012, at 142 (same).
272
See Daniels et al., supra note 6, at 112–16; Kevin E. Davis, Legal Indicators: The Power
of Quantitative Measures of Law, 10 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 37, 42 (2014).
273
See, e.g., Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle
East (2011); Ryan Bubb, The Evolution of Property Rights: State Law or Informal Norms?,
56 J.L. & Econ. 555, 588–89 (2013); Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 895
(2008); Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East
270
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The idea that law matters for economic growth has a long history.274 In
the nineteenth century, Max Weber wondered why England, with its apparently irrational common law, industrialized before continental countries with seemingly more sensible civil legal systems.275 Later writers
turned Weber’s “England problem” on its head by arguing that the common law actually promotes economic development by constraining state
expropriation or protecting free markets.276 Douglass North and Barry
Weingast, for instance, argue that “the primacy of the common law courts
over economic affairs” set the stage for the Industrial Revolution in England by shielding private property from the Crown.277
Over the last twenty years, the “legal origins” theory has added to the
common law’s luster.278 That theory has evolved, but its core thesis is that
common-law and civil-law systems tend to produce different kinds of legal rules and that the common-law versions generally lead to better economic outcomes.279 This theory has shaped international aid efforts for
most of the twenty-first century, particularly through its influence on the
World Bank.280 Nearly every aspect of the legal origins theory has
Asia, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 829 (2000) (reviewing Katharina Pistor & Philip A. Wellons, The
Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic Development, 1960–1995 (1999); Kanishka Jayasuriya, Law, Capitalism, and Power in Asia: The Rule of Law and Legal Institutions
(1999); Robert S. Brown & Alan Gutterman, Asian Economic and Legal Development: Uncertainty, Risk, and Legal Efficiency (1998)).
274
See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking Law’s Relationship to the
Economy—Implications for Policy, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 831, 831–32 (2009).
275
See Joshua Getzler, Theories of Property and Economic Development, 26 J. Interdisc.
Hist. 639, 645–46 (1996). Weber himself seems to have concluded that England’s expensive
and adversarial procedure inadvertently spurred industrialization by favoring capitalists with
the resources and energy to navigate the common law. Id.
276
See, e.g., 1 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order 94 (1973).
277
North & Weingast, supra note 271, at 829; see also Ron Harris, Could the Crown Credibly Commit to Respect Its Charters? England, 1558–1640, in Questioning Credible Commitment: Perspectives on the Rise of Financial Capitalism 21, 28–31 (D’Maris Coffman, Adrian
Leonard & Larry Neal eds., 2013) (extending the “credible commitment” thesis to corporate
charters in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries).
278
See, e.g, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. Econ. Lit. 285 (2008) (summarizing the theory). For
complementary analyses, see, for example, Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. Econ. 1193 (2002); and Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. Legal Stud. 503 (2001).
279
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Law and Finance
After a Decade of Research, in 2 A Handbook of the Economics of Finance: Corporate Finance
425, 427 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & René M. Stulz eds., 2013).
280
See World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets
65–66 (2002); see also Michaels, supra note 12, at 771 (describing the influence of the legal
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attracted criticism, from its description of the differences between common and civil law to its empirical conclusions about the superiority of
common-law economies.281 But although the legal origins theory has lost
much of its influence, it continues to shape the agendas of many scholars.282
Perhaps the most influential critique has come from Daron Acemoglu
and James Robinson (sometimes writing with Simon Johnson). Like the
legal origins theorists, Acemoglu and Robinson think that institutions
matter. But they argue that the presence or absence of English law is unimportant for a country’s long-term development.283 Instead, what matters
is whether a country’s institutions are “extractive” or “inclusive.”284
Moreover, unlike the legal origins theory—which assumes that European
empires invariably spread their own laws wherever they went—Acemoglu and Robinson focus on institutional variation among colonies.
They attribute this variation to each colony’s initial conditions, particularly the density of indigenous populations and the mortality rates of European settlers. In places where Europeans were able to settle in relatively
large numbers, they constructed “neo-Europes” with European-style institutions. Low European settlement, in contrast, led to “extractive states”
with institutions that served mostly to funnel wealth back home.285
origins theory); Holger Spamann, Empirical Comparative Law, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci.
131, 135–36 (2015) (same).
281
See, e.g., Berkowitz et al., supra note 32; Daniels et al., supra note 6; Ron Harris &
Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Contractual Flexibility Within the Common Law: Organizing Private
Companies in Britain and the United States (Nov. 23, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2874780; Klerman & Mahoney, supra note 7; Roe & Siegel, supra note 33; Holger
Spamann, Legal Origin, Civil Procedure, and the Quality of Contract Enforcement, 166 J.
Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 149 (2010). For a response to some of these criticisms, see
La Porta et al., supra note 279.
282
World Bank, World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law 87–88 (2017).
For the continuing relevance of legal origins, see, for example, Daniel Berkowitz & Karen B.
Clay, The Evolution of a Nation: How Geography and Law Shaped the American States 16–
59 (2012); and Lucas Kowalczyk & Mila Versteeg, The Political Economy of the Constitutional Right to Asylum, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 1219, 1276–80 (2017).
283
Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, What Are Institutions?, Why Nations Fail (Oct.
29, 2013), [https://perma.cc/SJG3-MWQN] (citing Acemoglu et al., supra note 38; Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. Pol. Econ. 949 (2005)).
284
See generally Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 271 (arguing that inclusive economic
institutions lead to more persistently inclusive political ones).
285
Acemoglu et al., supra note 38, at 1370; see also Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, &
James A. Robinson, Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the
Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q. J. Econ. 1231, 1234–35 (2002) (describing features of “extractive institutions”).

COPYRIGHT © 2019 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

532

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 105:483

Because of this causal story, Acemoglu and Robinson’s approach is sometimes known as the “endowments” or “institutional transplants” thesis.286
The legal origins and endowments theories reach antithetical conclusions about the importance of English law. But they agree in treating colonial legal institutions as the predictable product of initial conditions, rather than the contingent result of political conflict. The legal origins
theory has generally assumed that European empires uniformly imposed
their own laws everywhere—an assumption that is plainly inconsistent
with the reality of colonial legal pluralism.287 The endowments theory
makes the opposite move; by focusing on the importance of initial conditions in each colony, its framework implicitly assumes that legal pluralism was inevitable.288 (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson do not expressly address colonial legal pluralism, but other scholars have plausibly
286
See also Engerman & Sokoloff, supra note 38, at 44 (referring to initial conditions in
colonies as “factor endowments”). Some authors have tried to synthesize the legal-origins and
endowments approaches. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. Pol. Econ. 949, 950 (2005); Ross Levine, Law, Endowments and Property Rights,
19 J. Econ. Perspectives 61, 62 (2005); Oto-Peralías & Romero-Ávila, supra note 12, at 563–
64.
One recent variation on the endowments thesis is Sean Gailmard, Building a New Imperial
State: The Strategic Foundations of Separation of Powers in America, 111 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
668 (2017). Gailmard argues that the British Empire designed colonial institutions to solve an
agency problem with colonial governors, who might have been tempted to extract more rents
from colonists than the Crown preferred. Although this problem arose everywhere, “the specific agency problem differed across colonies with different economic endowments,” because
different endowments created different opportunities for rent-extraction. Id. at 681. As a result,
the Crown tailored colonial institutions to each colony’s economic endowments. Specifically,
the Crown created strong colonial assemblies in places where returns on settler investment
were moderate (i.e., the future United States), while limiting or blocking assemblies where
returns were very high (the Caribbean) or very low (Canada). This Article agrees with Gailmard that colonial institutions reflected a strategic political choice that linked institution outcomes with economic development. But the history of the eighteenth-century British Empire
also suggests that Gailmard’s article takes too deterministic a view of economic endowments,
which were the product, not just the cause, of variation in institutional outcomes.
287
See Daniels et al., supra note 6, at 153; Oto-Peralías & Romero-Ávila, supra note 12, at
563–64.
288
Acemoglu et al. expressly reject determinism: although high settler mortality “influenced” institutional outcomes and “stacked” the deck “against the creation of Neo-Europes,”
it did not dictate particular institutional outcomes. Acemoglu et al., supra note 38, at 1370; see
also Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 271, at 432 (denying that their work entails
“any . . . kind of determinism”). Yet the logic of their argument makes it hard to avoid drawing
deterministic conclusions. See Acemoglu et al., supra note 38, at 1370 (offering a schematic
summary of their argument); cf. Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 271, at 433 (“North America followed a different institutional trajectory than Peru because it was sparsely settled before
colonization . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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interpreted their work as explaining why European settlers transplanted
their legal systems to some colonies but not others.289) By treating colonial legal systems as the predictable product of initial conditions, the legal
origins and endowment theories have both been able to treat the postcolonial world as a natural experiment about law and development. If European empires did not have any particular agenda when they imposed different laws on different places, then they effectively set up a randomized
trial about the economic impact of different kinds of law.
That view needs to be revised.290 At least in the eighteenth-century
British Empire, colonial laws did not emerge automatically from initial
conditions but rather as the result of a contingent and contested policy
choice. As a result, there was at least sometimes a correlation between the
kind of law that the British Empire imposed and the kind of economy that
was supposed to develop, and it can no longer be assumed that legal institutions were exogenous to development outcomes. This is not to say
that the legal origins or endowments theories must be discarded. For instance, Acemoglu and his coauthors acknowledge that initial endowments
were “not the only, or even the main, cause of variation in institutions”;
their empirical approach requires only that differences in settler mortality

289

See Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, The Influence of History on States’ Compliance
with Human Rights Obligations, 56 Va. J. Int’l L. 211, 230 (2016); Oto-Peralías & RomeroÁvila, supra note 12, at 569. Acemoglu et al. seek to explain why European empires “tried to
replicate European institutions” in some colonies but not others. Acemoglu et al., supra note
38, at 1370. Since civil or common law is one such “European institution,” it seems reasonable
to interpret their work as offering a theory about legal transplants.
290
This argument builds on the work of other scholars who have discussed colonial legal
systems as the product of imperial policymaking. Daniel Klerman and coauthors, for instance,
have found that the identity of a country’s former colonizer—and, specifically, whether a postcolonial country was previously controlled by Britain or France—is “a better predictor of postcolonial growth rates than legal origin.” Klerman et al., supra note 1, at 405. In interpreting
that finding, these authors persuasively highlight the need to consider each empire’s policy
choices, not just the institutions those choices produced. But in doing so, their article does not
fully consider the extent to which legal origin may itself have been a policy choice. For instance, the article does not consider how or why colonies might have “officially or unofficially
retained substantial parts of their native legal system.” See id. at 381 n.3. Other critics of legal
origins have taken a similar approach, even when focusing expressly on the effects of legal
pluralism. For instance, Ronald Daniels, Michael Trebilcock, and Lindsey Carson argue that
modern rule-of-law outcomes in former British colonies depend partly on the extent to which
indigenous and English laws were integrated into a single system. This is a powerful insight
about the postcolonial legacy of legal pluralism, but their article expresses no view as to why
Britain might have adopted different policies for each colony. See Daniels et al., supra note 6,
at 129 n.68. As a result, the potential endogeneity of legal policy is left mostly unexplored.
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rates were “a source of exogenous variation.”291 It seems plausible that,
when the broader history of the British Empire is considered (including
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), this low bar will be met.292 Nonetheless, it seems worth asking how we might update existing theories of
law and development in light of this Article’s historical argument.
At first glance, the history of the eighteenth-century British Empire
does seem to support the claim that law matters for development—and,
more precisely, the claim that the common law leads to better development outcomes than other legal systems. To be sure, this Article has not
tried to prove that Britain’s legal policy actually changed any colony’s
economic or political trajectory. But contemporary politicians certainly
believed that English law would have far-reaching political and economic
effects. Moreover, merchants lobbied hard for the common law, and they
changed their investment decisions in response to whatever law Britain
imposed.293 Of course, people in the eighteenth century were not infallible
observers of their own society any more than we are today. But to the
extent that we think we have something to learn from people like John
Adams, Edmund Burke, or Lord Mansfield, it seems prudent to take their
ideas about legal pluralism seriously.

291

Acemoglu et al., supra note 38, at 1371 n.4.
Nonetheless, settler mortality may be a weaker instrument than hitherto believed. Cf.
Spamann, supra note 280, at 142 (discussing the difficulty in correlating legal development
origins to any one variable). For other methodological critiques of the endowments literature,
compare David Y. Albouy, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical
Investigation: Comment, 102 Am. Econ. Rev. 3059 (2012), with Daron Acemoglu, Simon
Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply, 102 Am. Econ. Rev. 3077 (2012).
293
Scholars of corporate and contract law often use the revealed preferences of sophisticated
actors to shed light on the relative desirability of different legal regimes. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 63, 109 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of
Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1475, 1476
(2009). It is unclear whether merchants today prefer the common law. See Mariana
Pargendler, The Role of the State in Contract Law: The Common-Civil Law Divide, 43 Yale
J. Int’l L. 143, 182 (2018) (“Although quite different in important dimensions, both English
law and Swiss law appear to be the most popular governing laws of choice among sophisticated business parties in international arbitration proceedings.”). Compare Stefan Voigt, Are
International Merchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds Doubt on the Legal Origin Theory, 5 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 1, 15 (2008) (arguing that more international merchants prefer
Swiss or French law than U.S., Canadian, or English law), with Exorbitant Privilege, The
Economist, May 10, 2014, at 59 (reporting that “American and English law and lawyers have
a stranglehold on cross-border business”).
292

COPYRIGHT © 2019 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2019]

Why Didn’t the Common Law Follow the Flag?

535

But even if the legal origins theory is right that law matters, it has misunderstood why. The theory’s most recent refinement suggests that common-law and civil-law systems lead to different development outcomes
because they embody different assumptions about the role of the state.
For instance, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei
Shleifer have contrasted “the policy-implementing focus of civil law versus the market-supporting focus of common law.”294 What matters, in
other words, is the contrasting “style[] of social control” that each legal
system evinces, rather than any particular substantive or procedural features.295 On this view, the common law is better because it supports a less
statist approach to governing.296
The dichotomy between statist civil law and free-market common law
has a rich history in comparative legal scholarship.297 But it does not quite
capture why English law mattered in the British Empire. To be sure, English law offered important protections against certain kinds of authoritarianism and expropriation.298 Common-law suits were the chief means of
redressing official misconduct, and civil juries played an important part

294
La Porta et al., supra note 279, at 478; see also Mahoney, supra note 278, at 505 (arguing
that “quite apart from the substance of legal rules, there is a sharp difference between the
ideologies underlying common and civil law, with the latter notably more comfortable with a
centralized and activist government”).
295
La Porta et al., supra note 279, at 455.
296
Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1, 61–64 (2001) (arguing that
the common law was more hospitable than the civil law to private ordering, including arbitration). This view of the common law as minimizing the state’s role aligns with what Peter
Evans described as neoutilitarian and public-choice theories of the state, which stress the need
to minimize the state’s policy-implementing role in order to close off opportunities for rentseeking. See Peter B. Evans, Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State, 4 Soc. F. 561 (1989).
297
See, e.g., Mirjan R. Damas̆ka, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative
Approach to the Legal Process 3–13, 71–84 (1986); John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law
Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 18 (2d
ed. 1985); cf. Robert W. Gordon, Hayek and Cooter on Custom and Reason, 23 Sw. U. L.
Rev. 453, 454 (1994) (describing Hayek’s contrast between “‘English’ or ‘bottom-up’” systems, which he favored, and “‘French’ or ‘top-down’” systems, which he did not). But cf.
Pargendler, supra note 293, at 185–87 (agreeing that the common law is associated with a
smaller role for the state, but suggesting that “legal traditions are not the cause but rather the
result of distinct styles of social and government organization”).
298
Cf. La Porta et al., supra note 279, at 455–56 (suggesting that the civil law and the common law represent different solutions to the “twin problems” of “disorder” and “state abuse”).
In addition, other aspects of the English constitutional tradition, such as a powerful elected
legislature, could have provided additional protection. See Gailmard, supra note 286, at 669.
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in protecting merchants from predatory state agents.299 But that is not
quite the same thing as saying that the common law was less statist or less
“policy-implementing.” To the contrary, Whigs favored the common law
precisely because of its “policy-implementing” consequences, which included strengthening merchants at the expense of large landowners, hastening cultural assimilation, encouraging anglophone immigration, and
fostering civic consciousness. One might convincingly characterize some
of these consequences as “market-supporting.” But it seems perverse to
describe Whigs’ efforts to use the common law to supplant seigneurial
power—whether in Bengal, Quebec, or the Scottish Highlands—as the
victory of private ordering over the state.300 Moreover, Whigs assumed
that the very act of transplanting English law would have required, or at
least have been accompanied by, significant state intervention.301 In short,
while the common law was government-limiting in some respects, it was
policy-implementing in others.
Instead of being uniquely laissez-faire, two other considerations made
the common law seem to favor development. The first was its signaling
function. Transplanting English law made it clear that Britain wanted to
support a particular kind of commercial development. Of course, prospective settlers and investors might have found English law to be attractive
in itself; but it also indicated that the British state was likely to offer other
kinds of support. For this reason, Fowler Walker, the Whig barrister and
lobbyist, described the initial imposition of English law on Quebec as
“nothing more than a royal Invitation to his Majesty’s subjects to settle.”302 Of course, the invitation could be withdrawn, as the Quebec Act
299

See supra note 154; cf. Edmund Burke, Commons Debate (June 10, 1774), in 5 Proceedings and Debates, supra note 126, at 208 (“No merchant thinks himself armed to protect his
property, if he is not armed with English law.”).
300
Cf. Pincus, supra note 117, at 16–18 (arguing that radical Whigs favored “activist,” prodevelopment policies).
301
For example, one anonymous Whig proposed that “for every Englishman that goes to the
Asiatic continent, let three or four Indian infants be brought over in the same vessel,” to be
raised in England or British North America. This program of state-directed migration would
train a corps of Indians who, “early habituated to the laws of England,” would then be able to
introduce English laws to Bengal. “Brecknock,” Political Observations, or Remarks, Taken
from the Last London Print of May 20, 1767, N.Y. Gazette, Aug. 3–10, 1767, at 1–2; cf. Taisu
Zhang, Cultural Paradigms in Property Institutions, 41 Yale J. Int’l L. 347, 411 (2016) (noting
that large-scale legal transplants often involve a substantial expansion of state power).
302
Fowler Walker to Lord Dartmouth (Oct. 16, 1765), Add MS 35914, 39–40, (on file with
BL); see also Thomas Townshend, Jr., Commons Debate (May 26, 1774), in 4 Proceedings
and Debates, supra note 126, at 442–43 (discussing “those subjects that had been invited by
the Proclamation that told them they were to have the law of England”).
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showed. But doing so was costly—as the Quebec Act also showed. The
Crown could grant English law by proclamation, but only Parliament
could take it away.
Conversely, the absence of English law became a self-fulfilling prophecy of underdevelopment. Withholding English law suggested that the
British state would withhold other kinds of support. And if British merchants believed that legal pluralism would be bad for a colony’s economy,
then their belief made it so when they avoided investing in legally plural
jurisdictions. As a result, even if French, Hindu, or Islamic law were intrinsically benign, their persistence in the British Empire might still have
retarded development, thanks to the preferences, prejudices, and assumptions of British subjects.303
Prevailing theories of law and development have mostly tried to measure the objective effects of different legal systems.304 In doing so, they
have started from the shared assumption that variations among colonial
legal systems were exogenous to development policy. This Article offers
a reason to question both of these moves. On one hand, this Article’s historical narrative highlights the subjective effect of legal difference. In the
British Empire, law shaped development not only through its objective
characteristics, but also by signaling the state’s intentions and by playing
on the prejudices and preferences of contemporary economic agents. On
the other hand, this Article has shown that the British policymakers consciously deployed different kinds of law to shape development outcomes.
As a result, variations among colonial legal systems did not create a natural experiment about the political and economic consequences of different kinds of law. It may well be possible for future researchers to untangle
the effect of English law per se from the effect that it may have had due
to contemporary assumptions about legal difference. But doing so will
require scholars to consider a new possibility: that some kinds of law may
outperform others thanks to a kind of placebo effect, in which the
303
Cf. Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 271, at 43 (emphasizing that economic development depends partly on investors’ confidence in state institutions). Daniel Oto-Peralías and
Diego Romero-Ávila have shown that colonial legal pluralism is often associated with worse
postcolonial economic outcomes in former British colonies. Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila,
supra note 12, at 614–15. But because their paper assumes that Britain “did not seek to transfer
its legal rules and institutions to territories politically organized and densely populated at the
time of colonization,” it is unable to explain why legal pluralism was problematic. See id.
304
Not all scholars have ignored the political side of legal transplants. See, e.g., Mariana
Pargendler, Politics in the Origins: The Making of Corporate Law in Nineteenth-Century Brazil, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 805 (2012).
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desirability of a particular kind of law depends at least in part on what
observers expect it to achieve.
These two dynamics—the common law’s role as a signal and the selffulfilling prophecy of law and development—are not the only reasons that
English law mattered. Eighteenth-century merchants cared about civil juries as checks on potentially hostile judges.305 English law may have offered other intrinsic advantages. But any attempt to measure these advantages must account for the dynamics of legal pluralism—whether a
colony’s laws were “considerably different from [laws] of the neighbouring Colonies,”306 as one contemporary lawyer put it.
B. Toleration as a Tool of Empire
Theories of law and development can create an uncomfortable dilemma. If the common law—or any other legal system—turns out to be
measurably superior to the alternatives, then developing countries face a
stark choice between maximizing economic growth and maintaining their
own customs. Understandably, many scholars saw this dilemma as troublingly imperialistic, and they sought to find a way around it.307
It is not surprising, then, that development experts have started to reject
Western legal imperialism and to reconcile their commitment to economic growth with a greater respect for legal and cultural diversity. In the
immediate aftermath of decolonization, reformers tended to treat legal
pluralism as an unfortunate obstacle to modernization.308 More recently,
however, scholars and development planners now tend to describe pluralism as “neither inherently good nor bad.”309 In essence, the World Bank
has caught onto what theorists of multiculturalism have been saying for
years.310

305
But cf. Klerman et al., supra note 1, at 399–400 (finding no evidence that juries “had any
effect on subsequent growth” in former colonies).
306
Maseres to Sutton, supra note 127, at 110.
307
See, e.g., Daniels et al., supra note 6, at 176; Jedidiah Kroncke, Law and Development
as Anti-Comparative Law, 45 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 477 (2012)
308
See Halliday, supra note 3, at 262–63.
309
World Bank, supra note 282, at 84; accord Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, Introduction, in Legal Pluralism and Development, supra note 244, at 1, 2–3.
310
See, e.g., James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity
(1995); Ralf Michaels, On Liberalism and Legal Pluralism, in Transnational Law 122, 123
(Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori & Suvi Sankari eds., 2014) (summarizing multiculturalist arguments for legal pluralism).
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The recent acceptance of legal pluralism in an international context coincides with American courts’ rehabilitation of their own country’s history of colonial legal pluralism. When the United States annexed several
Caribbean and Pacific islands following the Spanish-American War, it
declined to fully extend the U.S. Constitution or U.S. law to its new possessions.311 Traditionally, historians and legal scholars have described
this adoption of legal pluralism—especially as crystalized in the Insular
Cases—as the product of racism, imperial exploitation, and the lamentable abandonment of America’s earlier anticolonial commitments.312 Recently, however, some judges and commentators have offered a revised
history of U.S. colonial legal policy. In their telling, legal pluralism was
a wise decision for multiculturalism that avoided the deadening homogenization of an imperial American law.313
The example of the British Empire suggests a need to proceed down
this path with caution. To be sure, other scholars have already flagged
some of legal pluralism’s potential risks.314 From feminist critiques of the
cultural defense to progressive attacks on religious exemptions, judges
and scholars have frequently warned that a uniform legal regime can play
an indispensable role in safeguarding the rights of vulnerable

311
See Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag?: The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law 34, 77 (2009); Mark S. Weiner, Teutonic Constitutionalism, in Foreign
in a Domestic Sense, supra note 36, at 48, 64–65.
312
See, e.g., Burnett & Marshall, supra note 36, at 11–12; Andrew Kent, The Jury and Empire: The Insular Cases and the Anti-Jury Movement in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era,
91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 375, 387–93 (2018) (summarizing this perspective); Gerald L. Neuman,
Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L.J. 909, 964 (1991).
313
See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 657, 688–89 (2013) (describing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 757 (2008)); cf. Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1884 (2016) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (linking the preservation of Spanish law in Puerto Rico to the island’s political
autonomy); Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (declining to extend
birthright citizenship to American Samoa in part because doing so might endanger the territory’s “traditional, racially-based land alienation rules”); see generally Developments in the
Law—American Samoa and the Citizenship Clause: A Study in Insular Cases Revisionism,
130 Harv. L. Rev. 1616, 1696–1703 (2017) [hereinafter Developments] (summarizing the rehabilitation of the Insular Cases). This revisionism sits uneasily with recent accounts of how
the Kingdom of Hawai‘i voluntarily adopted Anglo-American law in the nineteenth century—
not merely as a foreign imposition, but as a means of furthering Hawaiian agency under pressure. See Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawai‘i: The Cultural Power of Law (2000); Carol
Weisbrod, Kites and the Sabbath: Legal Transplants and Pluralism in Hawai‘i (2014).
314
See Developments, supra note 313, at 1702–03.
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individuals.315 But this Article raises a different concern: that legal pluralism can help the state oppress the very groups whose rights it purports
to protect.
In the eighteenth-century British Empire, many Tories embraced legal
pluralism because it would help Britain exploit its colonial subjects. But
that policy prevailed thanks partly to the rhetoric of rights and humanitarianism. That rhetoric had a basis in truth: some colonial subjects did in
fact want to keep their own laws. Nonetheless, Tories’ arguments originated primarily with British policymakers and politicians, who exaggerated the demands and needs of colonial subjects in order to advance their
own agenda.
It seems unlikely, to say the least, that the World Bank or well-meaning
law professors have praised legal pluralism for similarly authoritarian
ends. And, of course, legal pluralism can offer irreplaceable benefits for
minority groups that seek to preserve a distinctive way of life.316 It would
be foolish to deny the damage that an unwanted common law can inflict.
Eighteenth-century Whigs and the Continental Congress recognized as
much when they sought to preserve French property and inheritance rules
in Quebec and Illinois. But the Whig compromise was neither an uncritical celebration of pluralism nor a blind pursuit of uniformity. Rather, it
was a painstaking attempt to balance the very real costs of assimilation
against the equally real danger of political and economic subordination.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered a new explanation for how and why Britain
transplanted English law to the colonies it acquired during the eighteenth
century. It has argued that Britain used colonial legal policy to further a
specific development agenda. Imperial officials transplanted English law
only to those colonies that they had chosen to develop along the lines of
British North America. In contrast, they used legal pluralism to ensure
political subordination and to encourage the development of extractive
economies. These decisions were not inevitably determined by each colony’s material endowments or the natural dynamics of empire. Britain
315
See, e.g., Katherine Franke, Religious Accommodation’s Roots in Legal Pluralism,
States of Devotion (Apr. 21, 2014), [https://perma.cc/23F2-KEUA]; Sharafi, supra note 3, at
146. These critics build on a long liberal tradition of deploying state power to police intragroup
exploitation. See Levy, supra note 74, at 29–31; Will Kymlicka, Two Models of Pluralism and
Tolerance, 13 Analyse & Kritik 33, 52 (1992); Michaels, supra note 310, at 124.
316
See Levy, supra note 74; Muñiz-Fraticelli, supra note 42, at 25–28.
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sought to create an extractive state in Quebec despite its temperate environment, while it sought to create settler colonies in the tropical climates
of West Africa and the West Indies. Instead, each colony’s legal system
depended on a contest between rival political parties about what kind of
empire Britain should become.
The eighteenth-century debates on which this Article has focused form
only one part of a broader story about the legal legacy of empire.317 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Britain periodically revisited
its approach to colonial law in response to new demands from colonial
subjects, new ideological trends, and political realignments.318 In the early
nineteenth century, the rise of liberal and evangelical universalism led
many Britons to reimagine their empire as an agent of reform, whose legitimacy depended on infusing the Indian legal system with English principles.319 Meanwhile, in Canada, the rebellions of 1837–38 convinced
many imperial officials that Britain’s earlier policy of fostering a distinctive Canadien identity had been a mistake, and that Canada’s future
317

Although this Article focuses on the eighteenth-century British Empire, it invites a
broader reconsideration of colonial law. The conflicts that divided the British Empire—over
political economy, governance, and the meaning of toleration—had analogies elsewhere. See
du Rivage, supra note 112, at 40–42; Pincus, supra note 117, at 68–73. It seems likely, then,
that those analogous conflicts also helped to shape colonial institutions. For instance, eighteenth-century Spanish officials debated the degree to which Latin American law should conform to Castilian standards, and whether that law should be administered by specialized tribunals or courts of general jurisdiction. See Christopher Peter Albi, Derecho Indiano vs. the
Bourbon Reforms: The Legal Philosophy of Francisco Xavier de Gamboa, in Enlightened
Reform in Southern Europe and Its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830, at 229, 231 (Gabriel
Paquette ed., 2009); Brian P. Owensby, Between Justice and Economics: “Indians” and Reformism in Eighteenth-Century Spanish Imperial Thought, in Legal Pluralism and Empires,
supra note 3, at 143, 143. Scholarship on France’s imperial legal regime is less plentiful, but
there, too, there is evidence that imperial policymakers disagreed about the desirability of legal
pluralism. See Laurie M. Wood, Across Oceans and Revolutions: Law and Slavery in French
Saint-Domingue and Beyond, 39 Law & Soc. Inquiry 758, 764, 773–75 (2014); Miranda
Frances Spieler, The Legal Structure of Colonial Rule During the French Revolution, 66 Wm.
& Mary Q. 365, 369–70, 408 (2009). These examples suggest that political ideology and partisan conflict have played an underappreciated role in shaping colonial law—and, therefore,
postcolonial institutions—across multiple European empires.
318
See, e.g., David Skuy, Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code of 1862: The Myth of the
Inherent Superiority and Modernity of the English Legal System Compared to India’s Legal
System in the Nineteenth Century, 32 Mod. Asian Stud. 513 (1998); D.A. Washbrook, India,
1818–1860: The Two Faces Of Colonialism, in 3 The Oxford History of the British Empire
395 (Andrew Porter & William Roger Louis eds., 1999).
319
See Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism 21–55 (2010); Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century
British Liberal Thought 7–8 (1999); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial
Liberalism in Britain and France 101–62 (2005).
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stability demanded anglicization.320 Such reevaluations of legal pluralism
recurred for as long as the British Empire lasted321—and even after it
ended.322 Although these later developments produced major shifts in colonial law, they never fully erased the juridical distinction that emerged
between anglicized and legally plural colonies. Indeed, in some places,
legal pluralism has proved more durable than the empires that created
it.323 And even where legal pluralism itself has faded, its economic and
political legacy often persists. As a result, understanding legal pluralism
remains a vital project.

320

See Roger K. Ward, Bijuralism as an Assimilation Tool: Lord Durham’s Assessment of
the Louisiana Legal System, 63 La. L. Rev. 1127, 1128–31 (2003).
321
See Coen G. Pierson, Canada and the Privy Council (1960); Mantena, supra note 319, at
89–118.
322
See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 244, at 54–59 (describing debates about whether independent India should preserve English institutions or restore traditional forms of justice).
323
See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 4.

